Much academic literature on trust is actually about trustworthiness

Evidence

Surprisingly, much of the literature on trust hardly mentions trustworthiness, even though implicitly much of it is primarily about trustworthiness, not about trust. Consider four striking cases. First, under the guise of discussing trust, the philosopher Bernard Williams (1988) gives an account of the possibilities of general trustworthiness, from which trust is merely inferred. Second, the economist Roland McKean (1975) ostensibly addresses the economics of trust, but his actual problem is that of trustworthiness. It is not trust itself that is the collective good in his account but trustworthiness. Creating institutions that help secure trustworthiness thus helps to support or induce trust. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 171

Categorization

Category: Contrarian or Surprising Claims

• XREF: Relevant to the integration: if the ‘trust’ literature is actually about trustworthiness, then Luhmann’s and Hobbes’ framings must be re-read as trustworthiness arguments.

Related

• Moralized accounts of trust actually moralize trustworthiness (similarity 0.90)
• Theories of trust as a good really describe trustworthiness, not trust (similarity 0.89)
• The literature mislabels trust as moral when really trustworthiness is moral (similarity 0.89)
• Moralizing trust often stems from confusing it with trustworthiness (similarity 0.87)
• Trust reduces to knowledge while trustworthiness is motivational (similarity 0.86)
• Most theories of trust rest on four assumptions irreconcilable with encapsulated interest (similarity 0.86)
• Explaining trust is epistemic, explaining trustworthiness is motivational (similarity 0.85)
• Trust is a kind of knowledge grounded in trustworthy evidence (similarity 0.85)
• Trustworthiness needs no moral groundings to sustain trust (similarity 0.85)
• Trust is rational expectation about the trusted party’s self-interest (similarity 0.85)
• Only encapsulated-interest accounts ground trust in prior trustworthiness judgments (similarity 0.85)
• Understanding trustworthiness must precede understanding trust itself (similarity 0.84)
• Trust is wrongly conflated with promise-keeping and entrusting (similarity 0.84)
• Institutions should cultivate trustworthiness, not trust itself (similarity 0.84)
• Virtue ethics and Kantianism can morally ground trustworthiness, but not trust itself (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• Accounts of trust as a good are really accounts of trustworthiness #exemplifies (0.95) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 336
• Moralized accounts of trust actually moralize trustworthiness #exemplifies (0.90) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 283
• Trustworthiness is easier to explain than trust and generates trust as knowledge #expands (0.72) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 681