Most theories of trust rest on four assumptions irreconcilable with encapsulated interest

Evidence

Several other visions of trust that are fairly clearly articulated, sometimes only implicitly in part, differ from trust as encapsulated interest. I discuss each of the main visions not as articulated by a particular advocate but as characterized by central assumptions that differ distinctively from the encapsulated-interest account. These assumptions are that trust is not a matter of knowledge (in other words, it is noncognitive), that it is normative in some moral sense, that it is dependent on the characteristics of the trusted other than the trusted’s commitments to the truster, and that it is a good in much the way that various consumption goods are goods or that capital of various kinds is a good. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 336

Categorization

• DEFINE: Lays out the fourfold taxonomy of alternative trust accounts — noncognitive, moral, character-dependent, and trust-as-good — which structures the reader’s comparison with Luhmann.
• XREF: Directly parallel to Luhmann’s distinction between trust (as encapsulated interest / familiarity-based) and confidence — Hardin’s taxonomy gives a grid for sorting these.