Moral choices are socially formed dispositions, not detached rational decisions

Evidence

More theoretical approaches challenge the very assumption that values can simply predict action. This approach acknowledges the diverse and not necessarily consistent sets of values of individuals, and points at the social nature of values – not just an intrinsic conviction but an embodied disposition developed socially through practice (Bourdieu, 1990). Bourdieu’s view of habitus and its implication on ethics (Sayer, 2010) adds complexity to the assumption that people simply follow norms, either through internalising them or for fear of negative consequences. This naïve view of moral behavior assumes a rational and detached free will, rather than seeing moral choices as “embedded in the flow of practice and concrete experience” (Sayer 2010, p. 5). — Yael Arbell, The Circle of Commoning, 76

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to habitus theory in Bourdieu and critiques of rational-actor models found across sociology and behavioral ethics literature. — connects to: Choices of activity and association shape which moral predicaments people face; Moral capacity arises socially but not from societal institutions — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 499; Binding moral constraints depend on social integration, not abstract principle — Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1648 (+8 more)
• corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Yael Arbell, The Circle of Commoning:…, 76

Related

• Moral capacity arises socially but not from societal institutions (similarity 0.85)
• Socialization manipulates but never produces moral capacity (similarity 0.81)
• Explaining morality as mere authority leaves its ultimate origin unexplained (similarity 0.79)
• Moral choice persists unchanged across historical situations (similarity 0.78)
• Binding moral constraints depend on social integration, not abstract principle (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Morality precedes society and society merely manipulates an already-existing moral structure #contradicts (0.82) — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 514
• Moral choice persists unchanged across historical situations #contradicts (0.82) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism, 29
• Binding moral constraints depend on social integration, not abstract principle #corroborates (0.80) — Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1648
• Social organization displaces autonomous moral drive with instrumental and procedural rationality #corroborates (0.80) — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 612
• Human morality is contingent rather than invariant across circumstances. #corroborates (0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 390
• Moral capacity arises socially but not from societal institutions #qualifies (0.73) — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 499
• Rationality in social theory attaches to systems and functions, not individual decisions #corroborates (0.72) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 308
• Moral responsibility can compel insubordination to socially upheld principles #complicates (0.72) — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 495
• Moral consistency can be learned rule-following rather than an innate disposition #complicates (0.72) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 503
• Choices of activity and association shape which moral predicaments people face #expands (0.70)