Rationality in social theory attaches to systems and functions, not individual decisions
Evidence
All activity which helps to orient human action more meaningfully in an exceptionally complex world, thus increasing the human capacity for comprehending and reducing complexity, would then have to be judged rational. This can only be done by means of system formation. So, from this point of view, the label ‘rational’ would not refer to decisions about particular actions but rather to systems, and functions for maintaining systems. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 308
Categorization
- DEFINE: Operationalizes Luhmann’s distinct sense of ‘rational’ — a functional-systems sense rather than decision-rationality — central to comparing with Giddens’s structuration.
- XREF: Directly contrasts with rational-choice renderings of trust (Milgrom/Root) the reader has curated; Luhmann relocates ‘rational’ from the actor to the system. Connects to Ishiguro: Stevens’s actions aren’t ‘rational decisions’ but system-maintenance. — connects to: Classical social theory defined modernity by the application of scientific rationality over tradition — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist…, 151; Modern rationality is procedural rather than substantive across all value spheres — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist…, 392; Instrumental rationality’s dominance results from system-lifeworld uncoupling, not from reason’s inherent dialectic. — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist…, 395 (+6 more)