Mollet’s political-warfare policies propelled the French army into politics.

Evidence

For de Gaulle, in his whole upbringing and career, the French army was everything—or almost everything—and its state of health was a far more pressing worry to him than either the F.L.N. or the pieds noirs. It was, however, no longer the same army that he had known so well in 1940–5, and since February 1956 its over-riding objective had been a political one; to push the authorities into carrying out a policy of Algérie française. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 948 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Teitgen, a hero of the Resistance who had survived Dachau, was little disposed towards an army takeover in Algeria in any shape, and he could hardly believe his ears. At first he thought the bronzed and rugged general had gone slightly out of his mind. On second thoughts, however, he decided he should delve a bit deeper, and called Faure in for a further discussion, this time recording it all on a tape. Fortified with it, he then went to warn Lacoste. Distressed by this news, especially as he regarded Faure as a “stout-hearted sort” (un coeur généreux), the governor-general despatched Teitgen to Paris to inform the Minister of Defence, Bourgès-Maunoury. Teitgen has told how the minister’s immediate reaction was to hope that the affair would not “make it impossible for one to go ski-ing”, and asked him whether he had said anything to “ce con-là”, Mitterrand, then Minister of Justice. Shocked by Bourgeès-Maunoury’s apparently frivolous lack of interest, as well as his disrespect for a fellow minister, Teitgen then went on to see Mollet himself. Mollet took the matter much more seriously, but in turn used the same expression in deprecating Bourgès-Maunoury — “ce con-là”! Teitgen returned to Algiers, disquieted at the apparent lack of solidarity within the government. Faure was recalled and sentenced to thirty days’ fortress arrest — the first senior officer to suffer such a penalty for dissidence in Algeria. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 540 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956; By 1956 the French army’s overriding aim became political, pushing Algérie française. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 948; The French army won militarily while losing the political and world battle — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1653 (+16 more)

Related

• A French army had not directly intervened in national politics since Napoleon’s coup (similarity 0.90)
• The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956 (similarity 0.89)
• Senior French officers plotted an army takeover in Algeria in early 1957 (similarity 0.87)
• The army viewed any negotiated ceasefire as toppling its war effort in Algeria (similarity 0.86)
• By 1956 the French army’s overriding aim became political, pushing Algérie française. (similarity 0.86)
• Military commanders seized power in both Algeria and France at the same moment (similarity 0.84)
• Military victory elevated the army to ultimate political arbiter in Algeria (similarity 0.84)
• Each French regime change since 1793 fractured army loyalties, uniquely in world history (similarity 0.83)
• Repeated regime changes left the French army uniquely divided over where its loyalties lay (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.82)
• The French army won militarily while losing the political and world battle (similarity 0.82)
• A coup plot against civil government in Algeria emerged in late 1956 (similarity 0.81)
• Sakiet’s fallout made the Algerian army feel betrayed by Paris. (similarity 0.81)
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria (similarity 0.81)
• French protests against torture deepened the army’s contempt for the Fourth Republic (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• By 1956 the French army’s overriding aim became political, pushing Algérie française. #corroborates (0.80) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 948
• Senior French officers plotted an army takeover in Algeria in early 1957 #exemplifies (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 540
• Mollet tripled French troop levels in Algeria to half a million in 1956 #expands (0.65)
• A French army had not directly intervened in national politics since Napoleon’s coup #qualifies (0.60)
• The Ben Bella kidnapping may mark the French army’s first self-directed political coup #exemplifies (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 485
• The army’s anti-Communist doctrine threatened French democracy by courting fascism #expands (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 532
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria #expands (0.60)
• The French army won militarily while losing the political and world battle #expands (0.55) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1653
• Execution of three French soldiers provided the army’s missing pretext for revolt. #exemplifies (0.55)
• F.L.N. executions of three French soldiers detonated the army’s May 1958 revolt. #exemplifies (0.55) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 831
• The FLN execution of three French soldiers detonated the army’s revolt. #exemplifies (0.55)
• France’s successive regimes since 1789 produced an army with uniquely divided loyalties #expands (0.50)
• The post-war French officer corps became more democratic while colonels turned into atavistic proprietors. #expands (0.50)
• Repeated regime changes left the French army uniquely divided over where its loyalties lay #expands (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1078
• The French army’s will to win sprang from 1940 humiliation, not colonial ideals #complicates (0.50)