Granting Tunisian and Moroccan independence without Algeria was a strategic error.

Evidence

Whereas, in the 1950s, Tunisia and Morocco were endowed with established systems of government and administration, when Algerian independence came her government had existed only in exile. Thus she was afflicted by a lack of cadres and a lack of experience; but, worst of all, the many latent rifts within the leadership now burst through the thin papering with which the exigencies of war had covered them heretofore. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1628 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

To begin at the beginning, in November 1954 France was caught at a major disadvantage because, in contrast to Britain over India, no French politician, not even Mendès-France or Mitterrand, let alone the Communists, could contemplate any kind of French withdrawal from Algeria. Mollet the Socialist echoed Mendès-France the Radical: “France without Algeria would be no longer France.” Throughout those critical first years, when a compromise peace might have been conceivable, France was hobbled by the ball-and-chain of Algeria forming an integral part of French territory. From then on she was hobbled by what the army wanted, or would not permit. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1649 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Franco-Algerian coexistence was destroyed by accumulated missed chances — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1611; Algeria lacked the established governing structures that Tunisia and Morocco enjoyed — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1628; French assimilation destroyed Algerian leadership cadres that could have been negotiating partners — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 317 (+7 more)

Broader Connections