Marxism is not economic reductionism and requires attending to ideas in their own terms
Evidence
Whether or not we try to develop an adequate Marxist theory of ideology from this point, it seems to be the case that the problem of ideology presents us with a paradigm instance of Marxist theory as such , what Althusser has called the necessity—and the difficulty—of holding on to “both ends of the chain” at once: the relative autonomy of a region (e.g., ideology) and its “determination in the last instance” (i.e., the determinacy of ideology by other instances, and, in the last instance, by the economic). It is the necessity to hold fast to the latter protocol which has, from time to time, sanctioned a tendency to collapse the levels of a special formation—especially, to collapse “ideas” or ideology into “the base” (narrowly defined as “the economic”). On the other hand, it is the requirement to explore the difficult terrain of “relative autonomy” (of ideology) which has given the field of ideology its awkward openness. It is through this gap—to borrow a recent metaphor of Althusser’s—that the “pup” of semiology continues to “slip between the legs” of a Marxist theory of ideology. — Hall, Stuart, Essential Essays, Volume 1, 371 (
#expands, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Marxism conceives society as overdetermined relatively autonomous levels, not a simple unity; A new Marxist paradigm seeks to overcome economism and reductionism; Marxist theory requires holding both relative autonomy and economic determinacy at once — Hall, Stuart, Essential Essays, Volume 1, 371 (+53 more)
Related
- Marxism must hold determination in the last instance without falling into absolute autonomy (similarity 0.95)
- Marxism conceives society as overdetermined relatively autonomous levels, not a simple unity (similarity 0.93)
- Marxist theory requires holding both relative autonomy and economic determinacy at once (similarity 0.92)
- Marxism reads social formations as overdetermined unities with relatively autonomous levels (similarity 0.92)
- The Second International enshrined reductive economic determinism as official Marxism (similarity 0.92)
- Attending seriously to religious ideology saved Hill’s Marxism from economic reductionism (similarity 0.91)
- Economic structures are necessary but not sufficient to explain political and ideological features (similarity 0.90)
- The core problem is reconciling economic determination with superstructural autonomy (similarity 0.90)
- The theory of ideology must hold both relative autonomy and economic determination simultaneously. (similarity 0.89)
- Marxist analysis needs both material grounding and historical specificity to avoid twin errors (similarity 0.87)
- Each Marxian premise alone yields reductionism or relativism (similarity 0.86)
- Political and intellectual action is the true expression of economic necessity (similarity 0.86)
- A new Marxist paradigm seeks to overcome economism and reductionism (similarity 0.86)
- Economic determinacy operates through overdetermination, not simple mechanical causation (similarity 0.86)
- Serious attention to ideology in its own terms strengthens rather than weakens Marxism. (similarity 0.85)
Broader Connections
- Economic change does not directly supply the content of capitalist ideas
#corroborates(0.85) - A new Marxist paradigm seeks to overcome economism and reductionism
#corroborates(0.80) - Marxist theory requires holding both relative autonomy and economic determinacy at once
#expands(0.75) — Hall, Stuart, Essential Essays, Volume 1, 371 - Marxism must hold determination in the last instance without falling into absolute autonomy
#expands(0.70) - Marxism reads social formations as overdetermined unities with relatively autonomous levels
#expands(0.65) - Each Marxian premise alone yields reductionism or relativism
#expands(0.60) - The Second International enshrined reductive economic determinism as official Marxism
#contradicts(0.60) - Marx overemphasized economics while neglecting power and technical detail
#contradicts(0.50) — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 2847