Private contracts can functionally entrench policy by making future change extremely expensive
Evidence
[A] political party in power might undertake to ensure the survival of its policies against the contingency of future political defeat by entering contracts that could make changes in policy extremely expensive. Proregulatory forces might enter long-term contracts with private entities for expensive regulatory services; antiregulatory forces might contract with the private sector to reimburse it for the costs of any future changes in regulation; small-government proponents might enter contracts promising compensation for any increase in taxes; biggovernment proponents might enter long-term employment contracts with government workers. By making it difficult or impossible to change policies once put in place, incumbent officials could thwart the possibility of democratic changes to public policy. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 163
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Political entrenchment means making political change more difficult than it otherwise would be — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 47; Functional political entrenchment works without changing formal legal rules — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 173; Entrenchment can serve public ends like precommitment and stability, not just self-serving power (+7 more)
Broader Connections
- Lease-construction contracts shift base construction costs onto future Congresses.
#exemplifies(0.90) - Contractual commitments shift negotiation costs rather than truly binding anyone
#contradicts(0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 68 - A legal contract channels stored political power toward private purposes
#corroborates(0.80) - Sunk investments create hostage situations where premature termination is costly.
#qualifies(0.75) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2532