Repeat players lobby legislatures and draft contracts to shape favorable law.
Evidence
“RPversus RP» Because litigation is a normal part of their doing business, repeat players typically retain experienced, specialized counsel. Thus, as in cases involving one-shotters; disputes between repeat players usually involve a rough parity in legal representation. Because repeat players, unlike one-shotters, expect to litigate, they tend to take steps to ensure Pa bia pep icated awe sectarorable sasthoie inbcrcetse They may seek to influence the law that government creates. Business and labor, for example, lobby hard on legislation dealing with laws that affect labor relations. If the applicable law arises out of private agreements, repeat players employ their legal expertise and negotiating skills to fashion favorable contracts. They also attempt to promote a body of judicial precedent favorable to their interests. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2282
Categorization
- XREF: Echoes Galanter’s insight that repeat players ‘play for rules,’ not just immediate victories. — connects to: Repeat players shape law itself to secure long-term advantage beyond winning individual cases. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1121; Repeat players can draft contracts and structure disputes to advantage themselves. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1122; Contingency fees are the main reason individual plaintiffs can sue repeat players. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2265 (+15 more)
Broader Connections
- Repeat players’ specialist counsel and litigation experience give them structural advantages.
#expands(0.95) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2287 - Litigants divide into occasional one-shotters and frequent repeat players who learn the system
#expands(0.93) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2258 - Lawyer groups with long-term stakes can equalize one-shotter bargaining power.
#complicates(0.85) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2290 - Complex legislation becomes a vehicle for corporate lobbying power
#complicates(0.85) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 1540 - Regulatory agencies’ rule-making lets lobbyists gut enacted laws
#complicates(0.85) - Judicial ethics bar justices from trading votes as legislators do.
#complicates(0.75) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 943 - Legislators frame favor-buying as routine constituent service
#complicates(0.75) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 1415 - Veto players are institutions with power to block policy change
#complicates(0.70) — Nathan Kelly and Jana Morgan, How US Policymaking Institutions…, 65 - Legal rules bind only when empowered constituencies have incentives to defend them
#complicates(0.70) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 471 - Long-term contracts can paralyze even prospective legislative power
#qualifies(0.70) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3010 - Cause-oriented and government repeat players litigate despite relational costs
#qualifies(0.70) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1116 - A legal principle emerges from a long line of decisions.
#qualifies(0.70) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 134 - Quorum rules assume a legislative fraction statistically resembles the whole.
#qualifies(0.70) — Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules, 225 - Congress deliberately delegated antitrust law creation to the courts via broad statutory language
#qualifies(0.70) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 273