Local Jewish financial presence did not amplify the Danat effect on Nazi voting

Evidence

Columns (3)–(7) introduce variables that measure the local presence of Jews in general, as well as in the financial industry (from Becker et al. (2014)): the share of Jews in the city population (share Jewish); Jews working in the financial sector as a share of total employment in the financial sector in 1882 (emp share of Jews in financial sector); and the employment share of financial services in 1882 (share all finance). Potentially, a larger presence of Jews locally could have exacerbated the impact of Danat’s failure on voting. In column (3), we interact each of these variables with a city’s presence of Danatbank to examine this possibility. Results show that neither of these variables directly, nor their interaction with danat, are significant in any of the specifications. The only variable that emerges as strongly significant is the presence of Danatbank. When we split the sample based on votes for the anti-Semitic party (columns 4 and 5) or historical pogroms (columns 6 and 7), results remain similar: only the coefficient on danat is positive and significant, and the effect is stronger in cities with historical anti-Semitism, irrespective of the chosen measure. — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 142

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Anti-Semitic cultural context magnified the Danat crisis’s radicalizing effect — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 151; Danat-exposed cities did not differ systematically on observable characteristics.; Danat exposure radicalized Nazi voting beyond the income losses it caused — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 113 (+4 more)

Related

• Danat exposure radicalized Nazi voting beyond the income losses it caused (similarity 0.92)
• Anti-Semitic cultural context magnified the Danat crisis’s radicalizing effect (similarity 0.91)
• Anti-finance sentiment alone cannot explain the Danat effect on Nazi voting (similarity 0.90)
• Danat-exposed cities did not differ systematically on observable characteristics. (similarity 0.89)
• Danatbank exposure raised Nazi vote share across multiple federal elections. (similarity 0.88)
• Danatbank-exposed cities saw a 2.9-percentage-point extra rise in Nazi vote share. (similarity 0.87)
• Danat exposure raised Nazi voting 1.7 to 2.5 percentage points across robustness checks. (similarity 0.87)
• Danat’s Jewish chairman being singled out explains its stronger radicalization effect over Dresdner’s. (similarity 0.87)
• Nazi vote share gained an extra 2.5 percentage points in Danat-exposed cities. (similarity 0.86)
• Exposure to Danatbank failure raised Nazi vote shares by roughly 3 percentage points (similarity 0.85)
• Falling local incomes from the banking crisis raised Nazi vote share substantially (similarity 0.85)
• Prior anti-Semitism roughly doubled the radicalizing effect of bank distress. (similarity 0.84)
• Only exposure to Danatbank, not Dresdner, raised Nazi voting despite identical economic losses. (similarity 0.83)
• Identical bank-failure income losses radicalized voters only where media singled out the bank (similarity 0.83)
• The Danat collapse boosted Nazi votes beyond nationwide crisis effects (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• The Danat collapse boosted Nazi votes beyond nationwide crisis effects #qualifies (0.90) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 150
• Nazi vote share gained an extra 2.5 percentage points in Danat-exposed cities. #qualifies (0.90) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 96
• Danatbank exposure raised Nazi vote share across multiple federal elections. #complicates (0.85) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 254