Identical bank-failure income losses radicalized voters only where media singled out the bank
Evidence
In Table 6 we contrast the diļ¬erential eļ¬ects of Danatās and Dresdnerās presence in more detail, as both banks failed during the crisis. Column (1) demonstrates that the presence of Dresdner Bank has an economically and statistically signiļ¬cant negative eļ¬ect on city-level incomes. Column (2) shows that it is similar to the impact of Danat ā the presence of either failing bank led to a virtually identical decline in city incomes. ⦠The electoral eļ¬ect, however, was strikingly diļ¬erent: column (3) shows that the presence of Dresdner Bank alone does signiļ¬cantly predict changes in Nazi votes. Once we add danat in column (4) we see that Danatās presence has a highly signiļ¬cant eļ¬ect on support for the NSDAP even after accounting for the presence of Dresdner. This pattern holds when we split our sample of cities into those with historically low or high vote shares for anti-Semitic parties (columns 5 and 6) or cities that did not or did experience pogroms (columns 7 and 8): while the eļ¬ect of Danat exposure on support for the NSDAP was exacerbated in historically anti-Semitic cities, no such pattern is discernible for Dresdner Bank. ā Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Politicalā¦, 123
Categorization
- QUESTION: Column 3 text reads oddly ā ādoes significantly predictā with no negative sign stated; worth verifying the direction and that Dresdner has a null/negative electoral effect.
- XREF: connects to: An unpublicized bank failure did not radicalize voters despite similar economic damage. ā Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Politicalā¦, 29; Only exposure to Danatbank, not Dresdner, raised Nazi voting despite identical economic losses. ā Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Politicalā¦, 94; The bank crisis radicalized voters beyond what income losses alone can explain ā Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Politicalā¦, 109 (+9 more)
Broader Connections
- Both failing banks hurt local incomes identically, isolating framing as the differentiator
#expands(0.92) ā Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Politicalā¦, 123 - Financial distress shifted Nazi votes beyond what income loss alone explains.
#exemplifies(0.85) ā Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Politicalā¦, 109 - Voter preferences respond to framing even when expected values are equal
#corroborates(0.82) - Anti-finance sentiment alone cannot explain the Danat effect on Nazi voting
#expands(0.80) ā Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Politicalā¦, 141 - Danat exposure radicalized Nazi voting beyond the income losses it caused
#qualifies(0.80) ā Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Politicalā¦, 113 - The bank crisis radicalized voters beyond what income losses alone can explain
#corroborates(0.78) ā Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Politicalā¦, 109 - Bad times make voters choose riskier challengers even with equal expected value
#corroborates(0.78) - Income losses from bank collapse radicalize voters more than equivalent general income declines
#complicates(0.75) ā Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Politicalā¦, 108 - Mainstream mediaās failure to explain the banking crisis empowered Tory narratives
#exemplifies(0.75) ā Mark Fisher (edited by Darren Ambrose), K-Punk, 1857 - The same ballot measure can be summarized in rival framing accounts
#exemplifies(0.72) ā Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3367