The Danat-radicalization result survives many robustness checks.

Evidence

Our findings are robust to a wide range of alternative specifications. We examine whether the memory of the hyperinflation (1921–23) or cities’ export exposure could account for changes in voting patterns and find no evidence. They are also robust to controlling for the share of the Jewish population, the share of Jews out of total employees in the financial sector, or the employment share of the financial sector in general. Through the inclusion of state-level fixed effects we also exclude the possibility that fiscal austerity explains our results. No single city or firm drives our results, and they do not change when we exclude entire regions such as the Ruhr (Germany’s industrial powerhouse) or the Austrian border region (potentially subject to spillover effects from Austria’s banking crisis). We also show that our results remain similar when we exclude the headquarter cities of smaller banks that failed in 1931/32, as well as all when we drop cities where Deutsche Bank, which was restructured in 1932, had a branch. They remain similar when we stratify our sample of cities by terciles of the unemployment rate in 1931. Their significance cannot be attributed to either spatial correlation in residuals. To overcome potential imbalances in covariates, we also show that our results are robust to coarsened exact matching and a differences-in-differences analysis with fixed effects. — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 39

Categorization

• QUESTION: Reader explicitly wants the robustness battery; this is the exhaustive list — but it covers general confounding rather than specifically separating income-loss from propaganda-salience effects, which seems to live elsewhere.
• XREF: connects to: Predictive radicalization claims rest on only ten cases — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of…, 593; Press coverage of Danat and its Jewish CEO dwarfed coverage of other failing banks. — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 55; Anti-finance sentiment alone cannot explain the Danat effect on Nazi voting — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 141 (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• Nazi vote share gained an extra 2.5 percentage points in Danat-exposed cities. #exemplifies (0.90) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 96
• Pre-1921 Danat exposure predicts identical effects to later connections. #corroborates (0.90) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 35
• Continuous exposure measures confirm Danat exposure boosted Nazi voting #corroborates (0.90) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 104
• Nazi vote-share paths in Danat towns are flat before July 1931. #corroborates (0.88) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 246
• Exposure to Danat predicted worsening unemployment only after the bank’s failure. #corroborates (0.82) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 146
• Predictive radicalization claims rest on only ten cases #complicates (0.80) — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, 593
• Press coverage of Danat and its Jewish CEO dwarfed coverage of other failing banks. #expands (0.80) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 55
• Anti-Semitic cultural context magnified the Danat crisis’s radicalizing effect #expands (0.80) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 151
• Anti-finance sentiment alone cannot explain the Danat effect on Nazi voting #qualifies (0.78) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 141