Danat-exposed cities did not differ systematically on observable characteristics.

Evidence

Table 10 examines whether cities with a presence of Danatbank already experienced a sharper downturn in economic activity in the early phase of the Great Depression, that is, before July 1931. To this end, it reports results for variations of our baseline regression (see equation (2)), where the outcome variables are different measures of unemployment (in levels or changes) at the city level. Column (1) shows that cities with a Danat presence did not see a statistically significant change in the unemployment rate from 1929 to 1930, relative to cities with no Danat presence. Column (2) reports a similar result for the change in the unemployment rate from 1930 to 1931. Column (3) shows that there were also no significant differences in the 1930 unemployment rate across cities with and without Danat’s presence. — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 144 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Columns (3)–(7) introduce variables that measure the local presence of Jews in general, as well as in the financial industry (from Becker et al. (2014)): the share of Jews in the city population (share Jewish); Jews working in the financial sector as a share of total employment in the financial sector in 1882 (emp share of Jews in financial sector); and the employment share of financial services in 1882 (share all finance). Potentially, a larger presence of Jews locally could have exacerbated the impact of Danat’s failure on voting. In column (3), we interact each of these variables with a city’s presence of Danatbank to examine this possibility. Results show that neither of these variables directly, nor their interaction with danat, are significant in any of the specifications. The only variable that emerges as strongly significant is the presence of Danatbank. When we split the sample based on votes for the anti-Semitic party (columns 4 and 5) or historical pogroms (columns 6 and 7), results remain similar: only the coefficient on danat is positive and significant, and the effect is stronger in cities with historical anti-Semitism, irrespective of the chosen measure. — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 142 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
• XREF: connects to: Danat-exposed cities had no pre-crisis unemployment divergence from other cities — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 144; Local Jewish financial presence did not amplify the Danat effect on Nazi voting — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 142

Related

• Danat-exposed cities showed no sharper pre-July-1931 unemployment downturn than other cities. (similarity 0.91)
• Danat-exposed cities had no pre-crisis unemployment divergence from other cities (similarity 0.90)
• Local Jewish financial presence did not amplify the Danat effect on Nazi voting (similarity 0.89)
• Nazi gains in exposed cities appeared only after the banking crisis, not before. (similarity 0.88)
• Danat’s 1920s lending expansion did not select riskier borrowers (similarity 0.88)
• Exposure to Danat predicted worsening unemployment only after the bank’s failure. (similarity 0.86)
• Danat exposure raised Nazi voting 1.7 to 2.5 percentage points across robustness checks. (similarity 0.83)
• Danat exposure caused worsening unemployment only after the bank failed (similarity 0.83)
• Danatbank-exposed cities saw a 2.9-percentage-point extra rise in Nazi vote share. (similarity 0.83)
• Exposure to Danatbank failure raised Nazi vote shares by roughly 3 percentage points (similarity 0.83)
• Anti-finance sentiment alone cannot explain the Danat effect on Nazi voting (similarity 0.81)
• Danat exposure radicalized Nazi voting beyond the income losses it caused (similarity 0.81)
• Nazi vote share gained an extra 2.5 percentage points in Danat-exposed cities. (similarity 0.81)
• Continuous exposure measures confirm Danat exposure boosted Nazi voting (similarity 0.81)
• Danat’s Jewish chairman being singled out explains its stronger radicalization effect over Dresdner’s. (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Danat-exposed cities had no pre-crisis unemployment divergence from other cities #corroborates (0.88) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 144
• Local Jewish financial presence did not amplify the Danat effect on Nazi voting #expands (0.80) — Sebastian Doerr et al., Financial Crises and Political…, 142