Analogical reasoning can operate as an intuitive particular-to-particular leap without a conscious rule

Evidence

In Adams, the question was the nature of the responsibility of the owner of a steamboat with sleeping compartments to an overnight passenger whose money had been stolen when, allegedly through the company’s negligence, a burglar broke into the plaintiff’s sleeping compartment. What makes the case interesting is that two divergent bodies of law were both potentially applicable. If the law pertaining to open sleeping compartments in railroad cars was applicable, then the company would not have been liable, but if the law pertaining to innkeepers applied, then the plaintiff would have been able to recover. The question was then whether the steamboat with closed passenger cabins was more like a railroad sleeping car or more like a hotel. … But in deciding that the steamboat was more like a hotel than a railroad sleeping car, the response to the skeptical challenge would go, the court did not first imagine what, on the basis of policy or principle, the best rule would be and then determine similarity on that basis. Rather, it looked at the two possibilities and simply “saw” more of a similarity in one direction than another. This might in theory have been reducible to some rule, but the rule did not consciously exist in the minds of the judges at the time they identified the similarity, so in fact for the judges the identification of similarity was a primary mental activity. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 183

Categorization

• QUESTION: Whether similarity judgments genuinely precede rules is an empirical cognitive-science question, as Schauer himself concedes.
• XREF: The ‘mental leaps’ framing connects to literature on case-based reasoning and prototype/category cognition. — connects to: Analogical reasoning fails when negative factual resemblances outweigh positive resemblances — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 593; Analogical reasoning infers additional properties from shared case similarities — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 570; Judicial generalization and analogical reasoning constitute the process of induction — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 676 (+10 more)

Related

• A single bone fragment can reveal the whole animal’s class through analogical reasoning (similarity 0.88)
• Analogical reasoning infers additional properties from shared case similarities (similarity 0.83)
• Intuitive representativeness heuristics systematically override logical probability reasoning (similarity 0.83)
• Legal analogy requires a theoretical basis rather than mere perception (similarity 0.82)
• Analogical reasoning fails when negative factual resemblances outweigh positive resemblances (similarity 0.82)
• Legal analogy argues from particular facts to particular consequences based on similarities (similarity 0.82)
• Legal reasoning reduces to the judge drawing distinctions and the lawyer predicting them (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Analogical reasoning infers additional properties from shared case similarities #corroborates (0.60) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 570
• Legal analogy requires a theoretical basis rather than mere perception #contradicts (0.60) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 608
• Analogical reasoning fails when negative factual resemblances outweigh positive resemblances #qualifies (0.50) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 593
• Judicial generalization and analogical reasoning constitute the process of induction #expands (0.50) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 676
• Reflective thinking connects known facts to unknown conclusions through inferences #expands (0.50) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 761