Freedom from domination rests on normative respect, not fear of sanctions.

Evidence

One reason that widespread civility is needed is that people can be assured of their non-domination only so far as others recognize normative reasons for respecting them, not just reasons connected to fear of legal sanctions. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 1289 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

The freedom enjoyed by these Germanic warriors was essentially the freedom of egoism, of greed—a taste for battle, conquest, and plunder. The freedom of these warriors is not the freedom of tolerance and equality for all; it is a freedom that can be exercised only through domination. Far from being a freedom based upon respect, it is, in other words, a freedom based upon ferocity. — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 164 (#expands, via linked claim)

A rule can never be binding just because some person with physical power wants it to be so. He must have authority to issue the rule or it is no rule, and such authority can only come from another rule which is already binding on those to whom he speaks. That is the difference between a valid law and the orders of a gunman. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 48 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: A republic’s stability rests on assurance that all will respect shared rules. — Adelin-Costin Dumitru, Forging the Resistive Republic: Social…, 18; Freedom as non-domination is constituted by institutions, not caused by them. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 1238; Non-domination requires normative reasons for respect, not just legal sanctions — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 1289 (+6 more)

Related

• Non-domination requires normative reasons for respect, not just legal sanctions (similarity 0.90)
• Freedom as non-domination is constituted by institutions, not caused by them. (similarity 0.86)
• Freedom as non-domination protects against the goodwill of others turning sour. (similarity 0.83)
• A benign master still dominates, so freedom requires civic status, not mere non-interference. (similarity 0.82)
• Freedom as non-domination is a universal primary good requiring state action to secure. (similarity 0.81)
• Freedom requires a well-ordered institutional framework to reduce domination. (similarity 0.81)
• Restraint by fair law is compatible with freedom, unlike arbitrary sway (similarity 0.81)
• Freedom can be defined through domination rather than through respect for others. (similarity 0.81)
• Living without domination, uncertainty, and subordination is a great universal good. (similarity 0.80)
• Freedom as non-domination, unlike non-interference, cannot be fully enjoyed by one person alone (similarity 0.80)
• A kindly master dominates subjects without interfering while well-ordered law interferes without dominating (similarity 0.80)
• Republican freedom depends on laws that constrain power without creating new domination (similarity 0.80)
• Law can be non-arbitrary and freedom-preserving rather than inherently dominating (similarity 0.80)
• Freedom can be reconceived as non-domination rather than non-interference or self-mastery (similarity 0.80)
• Well-formed law ranks with natural obstacles, not coercive domination (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Non-domination requires normative reasons for respect, not just legal sanctions #corroborates (0.97) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 1289
• Freedom can be defined through domination rather than through respect for others. #expands (0.75) — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 164
• Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone. #corroborates (0.75) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 48
• Freedom can be reconceived as non-domination rather than non-interference or self-mastery #expands (0.72) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 1207
• Paternalistic domination uses conditional love, not force, to secure subordinate compliance. #corroborates (0.72) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 671