Security against false alarm and against surprise have opposite externalities

Evidence

Economists may find the situation reminiscent of two producers who both allocate their limited productive resources between two commodities. One commodity, “security against false alarm,” involves external economies; the other, “security against surprise,” involves external diseconomies. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 827

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines two competing security goods by their externality structure: good for others versus bad for others — a compact framework for any shared-protection arrangement.
• XREF: Maps onto the reader’s Godfather-as-enforcer frame: the Mafia’s enforcement produces ‘security against disloyalty’ for one party while creating ‘security against betrayal’ costs for the other — opposite externalities of a single resource. — connects to: Inspection schemes can gather too much information and increase vulnerability — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 558; Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491; Discovery rules exist to prevent surprise tactics and evidence hiding. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2223

Related

• Inspection schemes can gather too much information and increase vulnerability (similarity 0.79)
• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking #exemplifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491