Innate qualities constrain but do not abolish freedom within a situation

Evidence

Many people now favour Genet’s view over Sartre’s, considering that regardless of other factors that may enter the mix, some of us simply are gay, or at least have a strong propensity in that direction. Sartre seemed to feel that, if we do not completely choose our sexuality, we are not free. But, to turn his own words back on him, ‘we cannot follow him in this’ — at least, I can’t. Why should sexual orientation not be like other mostly innate qualities, such as being tall or short — or being extroverted or introverted, adventurous or riskaverse, empathetic or self-centred? Such tendencies seem at least partly inborn, yet even within the terms of Sartre’s philosophy they do not make us unfree. They simply form part of our situation — and existentialism is always a philosophy of freedom in situation. — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 717

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Clarifies the crucial Sartrean concept of ‘freedom in situation’ — that facticity and freedom coexist rather than oppose.
  • XREF: This reconciles Sartre with a modern, scientifically-informed view of innate dispositions — a bridge for the reader between existentialism and contemporary thought. — connects to: Birth-place restricts freedom, whether this enslaves or enables; Environmental adversity only reorients choice; it does not cancel freedom; Empirical freedom is a negative concept defined by absence of constraint within a situation. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1158 (+16 more)
  • DEEPTHINKING: A genuinely nuanced resolution: the book resolves Sartre’s apparent denial of biology by showing innate tendencies as part of ‘situation’ rather than negations of freedom — a subtle, sit-with-it move.

Broader Connections