Errantry is compatible with the will to identity as situated freedom
Evidence
The thought of errantry is not apoliticai nor is it inconsistent with the will to identity, which is, after aIl, nothing other than the search for a freedom within particular surroundings. If it is at variance with territorial intolerance, or the predatory effects of the unique l’Qot (which makes processes of identification so difficult today), this is because, in the poetics of Relation, one who is errant (who is no longer traveler, discoverer, or conqueror) strives to know the totality of the world yet already knows he will never accomplish this-and knows that is precisely where the threatened beauty of the world resides. — Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 160
Categorization
- XREF: The will to identity as freedom-in-surroundings, not fixed essential essence, is exactly the non-collapsing version of strategic essentialism the reader is hunting. — connects to: Errantry can be rooted in a will rather than rhizomatically dispersed — Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 266; Innate qualities constrain but do not abolish freedom within a situation — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 717; Errantry, unlike exile, reinforces rather than erodes identity — Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 158 (+2 more)
- DEFINE: Defines errantry’s politics against territorial monoroot identity while preserving a freedom-seeking identity will.
Broader Connections
- Errantry, unlike exile, reinforces rather than erodes identity
#corroborates(0.85) — Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 158 - Freedom and situation are mutually constituting rather than opposites
#corroborates(0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1164 - Innate qualities constrain but do not abolish freedom within a situation
#qualifies(0.75) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 717 - The self is the individualized completion of concrete situated consciousness
#expands(0.72)