Consciousness freely constitutes actions as performable through possibilization

Evidence

Many people now favour Genet’s view over Sartre’s, considering that regardless of other factors that may enter the mix, some of us simply are gay, or at least have a strong propensity in that direction. Sartre seemed to feel that, if we do not completely choose our sexuality, we are not free. But, to turn his own words back on him, ‘we cannot follow him in this’ — at least, I can’t. Why should sexual orientation not be like other mostly innate qualities, such as being tall or short — or being extroverted or introverted, adventurous or riskaverse, empathetic or self-centred? Such tendencies seem at least partly inborn, yet even within the terms of Sartre’s philosophy they do not make us unfree. They simply form part of our situation — and existentialism is always a philosophy of freedom in situation. — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 717 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

A for-itself which would have to be a self without being itself would be conceivable. The For-itself which I am simply has to be what it is in the form of a refusal of the Other; that is, as itself. Thus by utilizing the formulae applied to the knowledge of the Not-me in general, we can say that the For-itself as itself includes the being of the Other in its being in so far as its being is in question as not being the Other. … In other words, in order for a consciousness to be able to not-be the Other and therefore in order that there may be an Other without making this non-being, which is the condition of the self of consciousness, become purely and simply the object of the establishment of a “third man” as witness, two things are necessary: consciousness must have to be itself and must spontaneously have to be this non-being; consciousness must freely disengage itself from the Other and wrench itself away by choosing itself as a nothingness which is simply Other than the Other and thereby must be reunited in “itself.” This very detachment, which is the being of the For-itself, causes there to be an Other. This does not mean that it gives being to the Other but simply that it gives to the Other its being-other or the essential condition of the “there is.” — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 775 (#expands, via linked claim)

For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness can never be a ‘nothingness’ radically divided from being, as Sartre had proposed in Being and Nothingness. He does not even see it as a ‘clearing’, like Heidegger. When he looks for his own metaphor to describe how he sees consciousness, he comes up with a beautiful one: consciousness, he suggests, is like a ‘fold’ in the world, as though someone had crumpled a piece of cloth to make a little nest or hollow. It stays for a while, before eventually being unfolded and smoothed away. — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 739 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Consciousness freely chooses itself as not being the Other. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 775; Consciousness is a temporary fold in being, not separate from it — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 739; Nothingness is a supported recoil from Being that enables consciousness to exist (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Innate qualities constrain but do not abolish freedom within a situation #qualifies (0.80) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 717
• Consciousness freely chooses itself as not being the Other. #expands (0.78) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 775
• Consciousness is a temporary fold in being, not separate from it #complicates (0.75) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 739
• Freedom is compatible with determinism when thought is part of the causal mix #qualifies (0.74)
• Habit converts learned subjection into free action #expands (0.73) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 404
• Nothingness is a supported recoil from Being that enables consciousness to exist #expands (0.72)