In low-trust societies commerce stays confined within family and friend circles.

Evidence

In low-trust societies, people tend to exhibit wariness in dealing with others they do not know personally. Research on economies in transition and on entrepreneurship shows that usually the market for exchange is limited to close circles of family and friends. Businesses are usually funded in cooperation with partners that one has personal relations with, characterized by high levels of relational trust. — TOMASZ OLEJNICZAK, Development of Trust in Low-Trust…, 231

Categorization

• XREF: Mirrors the reader’s framing of Wharton’s New York: exchange is limited to those one knows personally or is linked to through close ties — the same high-density-network constraint. — connects to: Closed communities enforce trust through overlapping religious, family, and residence ties. — Coleman, SocialCapitalCreation-1988, 46; Trust limits help explain cliques, familism, and ethnic exclusion.; Relational network-based informal institutions tend toward closure and block generalized trust. — TOMASZ OLEJNICZAK, Development of Trust in Low-Trust…, 171 (+2 more)

Related

• Relational network-based informal institutions tend toward closure and block generalized trust. (similarity 0.85)
• Closed communities enforce trust through overlapping religious, family, and residence ties. (similarity 0.84)
• Hostile larger societies drive stronger localized trust enclaves (similarity 0.81)
• Widespread trust consists of pockets of dyadic relationships, not generalized sentiment (similarity 0.81)
• TOMASZ OLEJNICZAK — Development of Trust in Low-Trust Societies (similarity 0.80)
• Trustworthiness beyond the family requires networks that extend past kin (similarity 0.80)
• Social relations are sufficient but not necessary conditions for trust in economic life. (similarity 0.80)
• Trust extends kin-group loyalty outward to the whole society (similarity 0.80)
• Trust flourishes most where neither kinship nor contract obligations apply (similarity 0.80)
• Trust governs dealings only where kinship and contract cannot constrain others (similarity 0.80)
• Trust can arise even when transactions are not embedded in social relations. (similarity 0.80)
• Trust flourishes only in the gaps left by kinship and contract structures (similarity 0.79)
• Trust limits help explain cliques, familism, and ethnic exclusion. (similarity 0.79)
• Economic transactions are governed by their embeddedness in social networks (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Trust limits help explain cliques, familism, and ethnic exclusion. #expands (0.90)
• Closed communities enforce trust through overlapping religious, family, and residence ties. #corroborates (0.85) — Coleman, SocialCapitalCreation-1988, 46
• Relational network-based informal institutions tend toward closure and block generalized trust. #expands (0.82) — TOMASZ OLEJNICZAK, Development of Trust in Low-Trust…, 171
• Poverty-driven trust in family can produce active distrust of all outsiders. #expands (0.80)
• Trust flourishes most where neither kinship nor contract obligations apply #qualifies (0.75)