Ignorance of another’s intentions yields neither trust nor distrust

Evidence

One might think of distrust as the complement of trust, so that if I do not trust you with respect to something, I distrust you. As is implied in the opening paragraph of this chapter, I treat it here rather as the negative of trust. If I trust you, I have specific grounds for the trust. In parallel, if I distrust you, I have specific grounds for the distrust. I could be in a state of such ignorance about you, however, that I neither trust nor distrust you. I may therefore be wary of you until I have better information on you. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 432 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Trust operates through uncommunicated inferences rather than explicit justification; Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation; Trust is a fragile coping device for ignorance about others’ future behavior — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2719 (+3 more)

Broader Connections