Ignorance of another’s intentions yields neither trust nor distrust
Evidence
One might think of distrust as the complement of trust, so that if I do not trust you with respect to something, I distrust you. As is implied in the opening paragraph of this chapter, I treat it here rather as the negative of trust. If I trust you, I have specific grounds for the trust. In parallel, if I distrust you, I have specific grounds for the distrust. I could be in a state of such ignorance about you, however, that I neither trust nor distrust you. I may therefore be wary of you until I have better information on you. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 432 (
#qualifies, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Trust operates through uncommunicated inferences rather than explicit justification; Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation; Trust is a fragile coping device for ignorance about others’ future behavior — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2719 (+3 more)
Related
- Distrust is the negative of trust, not its complement, leaving room for neutral wariness (similarity 0.88)
- Not trusting someone usually means actively distrusting, yet ignorance yields neither state (similarity 0.87)
- Trust is a fragile coping device for ignorance about others’ future behavior (similarity 0.84)
- Distrust needs less information than trust to form. (similarity 0.84)
- Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation (similarity 0.83)
- Trust grounded in false knowledge cannot be an intrinsic good (similarity 0.82)
- Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose (similarity 0.81)
- Trust is required only amid ignorance, which always grounds scepticism as well. (similarity 0.81)
- Trust reduces to knowledge while trustworthiness is motivational (similarity 0.81)
- Trust is not reducible to emotion the way joy might be (similarity 0.81)
- Excess knowledge that trust is being built can itself collapse it into distrust (similarity 0.81)
- Trust is a matter of knowledge and belief, not of choice or action. (similarity 0.81)
- Trust and distrust are asymmetric in motivation and epistemology, not mirror images (similarity 0.81)
- Distrust self-reinforces by withholding the information cooperation would provide (similarity 0.81)
- Trust breaks down both from ignorance and from awareness that trust-building is being attempted (similarity 0.81)
Broader Connections
- Trust operates through uncommunicated inferences rather than explicit justification
#expands(0.85) - Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation
#expands(0.80) - Trust is a fragile coping device for ignorance about others’ future behavior
#corroborates(0.75) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2719 - Distrust is the negative of trust, not its complement, leaving room for neutral wariness
#qualifies(0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 432 - Familiarity prevents trust from becoming a conscious problem; doubt reopens it.
#corroborates(0.70)