Trust and distrust are asymmetric in motivation and epistemology, not mirror images

Evidence

Despite parallel definitions, trust and distrust sometimes work in contrary ways. First, they have asymmetric grounds, both motivational and epistemological. Second, they have substantially asymmetric implications for behavior and for society. … In many contexts, the chief epistemological difference comes from the general fact that we can expect our interests to be in conflict with those of relevant others so that we cannot expect that, even if our interests are encapsulated in theirs, our interests will trump their own. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 433

Categorization

• XREF: The motivational asymmetry (misplaced trust costs more than forgone trust) maps directly onto Hardin’s encapsulated-interest theory and the reader’s synthesis with the blindness collapse: in Saramago, distrust becomes rational once monitoring collapses precisely because the cost of misplaced trust skyrockets. — connects to: Vigilance is performative distrust that coexists with deep general trust