Groups are scapegoated for perceived power and malevolence, not vulnerability.

Evidence

The model proposed here is quite different from the scapegoating theory Allport described. Importantly, it yields several implications that directly contradict earlier versions. First, only collective, not individual-level frustrations are likely to foster scapegoating. Second, groups that are perceived to be powerful (not weak and vulnerable) are likely to be victimized. Third, because frustration is an underlying, but not the proximal, cause of aggression, the lessening of frustrations may actually increase (not decrease) scapegoating (if improved conditions are attributed to the scapegoat movement). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1609 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Thus parts A–E of the current model answer many of Allport’s critiques of earlier scapegoat theory (corresponding to Allport’s numbered critiques): (1) Why does frustration not always lead to intergroup aggression? Because only widely shared (not individual) frustrations are likely to lead to scapegoating. (2) Why is aggression ever “displaced”? Aggression may be better characterized as misplaced as a result of prior cultural stereotypes that characterize an outgroup as having the ability and intent to cause harm to the ingroup. (3) Why would human nature include an inherently maladaptive displacement tendency? It does not; a generally adaptive attribution process, due to limited cognitive capacity, imperfect knowledge, and motivational and cultural biases, results in misplaced blame. (4) Which groups are likely to be scapegoated? Successful but resented minorities. (5) Are groups always chosen for their perceived vulnerability? No, precisely the opposite – groups are scapegoated because they are (often falsely) perceived to be powerful and malevolent. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1599 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Thus, Allport’s critique that it “is not true that a defenseless minority is always chosen” (p. 351) is turned into a much stronger claim in the model presented here – it is precisely the perceived power of a group (not its perceived weakness) that makes it likely to be scapegoated. Earlier views dismissed perceptions of the scapegoat’s power and malevolence as mere projections (of perpetrators’ own megalomania and murderous intentions), but for the genocides listed above, envious stereotypes can be traced to prior historical circumstances (e.g., a middleman role) that conditioned the structural relations between groups. Envious stereotypes are here viewed more as a cause (increasing the likelihood that a group will be blamed for misfortunes) than a consequence of scapegoating. When a history of envious prejudice collides with a precipitous decline in a society’s life conditions, successful minorities are at grave risk. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1595 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Weak, nearby groups become scapegoats because aggressing against the powerful is unsafe — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social…, 742; Scapegoats must be perceived as powerful and intentful, not merely weak.; Groups are scapegoated for perceived power, not weakness — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 1609 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• Groups are scapegoated for perceived power, not weakness #corroborates (0.99) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1609
• Scapegoats are chosen for perceived power, not vulnerability. #corroborates (0.97) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1599
• Perceived power, not weakness, makes minorities likeliest to be scapegoated #corroborates (0.95) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1595
• Scapegoating targets resented minorities perceived as powerful, not vulnerable ones. #corroborates (0.94) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1599
• Scapegoats are powerful groups, not weak and vulnerable ones. #corroborates (0.93) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1609
• Social groups make ideal scapegoats because of their permanence and stability #complicates (0.74) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 123