Group intentions cannot be reliably ascribed to legislatures

Evidence

Those who oppose the use of legislative history deny that one can ascribe an intention to groups such as legislative bodies or constitutional conventions. They note that statutes and constitutional provisions are the product of group deliberations. Many of those who vote for a measure never state their view of what it means or how it should be interpreted. Those who do speak may do so primarily to influence the judicial interpretation of the provision. There is no reason to assume, however, that the views of those who speak during legislative debates are representative. Legislators may have quite different understandings of the enactments they adopt. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2482

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the ch.117 claim that legislative history supplies evidence of an enactment’s purpose — this passage supplies the opposing critique. — connects to: Legislative history supplies evidence of an enactment’s purpose and intended meaning — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2460; No single legislative intent exists because enactments emerge from group deliberation — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1228; Large groups facing collective-action dilemmas cannot be trustworthy as groups. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 810 (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• Large groups facing collective-action dilemmas cannot be trustworthy as groups. #corroborates (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 810
• People read coordinated intent into states that are actually blundering #corroborates (0.80)
• Group-interest voters lack the contextual grasp to respond ideologically without elite guidance #corroborates (0.75)
• Communal philosophy need not imply unanimous belief among members #corroborates (0.72)
• Constituting the people politically need not preclude pluralism within that association #corroborates (0.72) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 242