No single legislative intent exists because enactments emerge from group deliberation

Evidence

Those who, like Justice Antonin Scalia, oppose the use of legislative history deny that one can ascribe an intention to groups such as legislative bodies or constitutional conventions. They note that statutes and constitutional provisions are the product of group deliberations. Many of those who vote for a measure never state their view of what it means or how it should be interpreted. Those who do speak may do so primarily to influence the judicial interpretation of the provision. There is no reason to assume, however, that the views of those who speak during legislative debates are representative. Legislators may have quite different understandings of the enactments they adopt. Opponents argue that, given the unreliability of legislative history, judges should ignore it in favor of analysis of the enactment and judicial rulings interpreting it. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1228

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: The claim that group bodies cannot have intentions unsettles the deep assumption behind much statutory interpretation.
• XREF: This anti-intentionalism echoes the collective-intentionality literature and the private-judges/rational-choice debates. — connects to: Due process means procedural fairness shaped by context rather than fixed content — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 806; Group intentions cannot be reliably ascribed to legislatures — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2482; Legislative history supplies evidence of an enactment’s purpose and intended meaning — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2460

Broader Connections

• Group intentions cannot be reliably ascribed to legislatures #corroborates (0.95) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2482
• Legislative history supplies evidence of an enactment’s purpose and intended meaning #contradicts (0.85) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2460