Communal philosophy need not imply unanimous belief among members

Evidence

The dualisms inherent in social forms stem both from man’s ambivalent instinctual dispositions and from society’s need to have some ratio of discordant to harmonious tendencies in order to attain a determinate shape. Publicity and privacy, conformity and individuation, antagonism and solidarity, compliance and rebelliousness, freedom and constraint are some of the many specific sociological dualisms which Simmel finds compresent in social interaction and utilizes to analyze the structure of various social forms. — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 85 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

The foundation of this view is that an individual person’s identity is constituted by her fellows in community. The purpose of this view is mainly stated in contrast to what is assumed to be the standard Western Cartesian location of an individual’s identity in the “I”. The African view contrasts the “I” emphasis, with a collectivist view of the “We” as foundational to the definition of the individual. In African philosophy, this view has come to be known as the communitarian view of personhood, and among its fierce proponents are the theologian John Mbiti (1970) and the philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984). — Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 434 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: “The people” is itself a contested construct, not a fixed subject; Buddhist precepts were classically individual commitments, not structural demands — , The Rod and the Child: A Global History…, 3984; Ubuntu personhood defines the self only through communal relation — , The Rod and the Child: A Global History…, 4252 (+14 more)

Broader Connections