Ambiguous legislative history does not justify abandoning its use

Evidence

But this is no real argument against the use of legislative history. As Professor Kenneth Davis has put it, that would be “a little like saying that we should not drill for oil because much of the drilling ends with dry holes. The important fact is that some of the drilling yields oil.” — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 519

Categorization

• SEED: The oil-drilling metaphor is a compact teaching trope for why imperfect interpretive evidence still matters, useful in the classroom context.
• XREF: connects to: Congress can withhold executive power through legislative history as decisively as through enacted words — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 2813; Reliance on legislative history makes law inaccessible to ordinary lawyers and citizens. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1796; Courts decide statutory meaning where legislative intent is genuinely ambiguous — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 490 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Courts decide statutory meaning where legislative intent is genuinely ambiguous #complicates (0.82) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 490
• Group intentions cannot be reliably ascribed to legislatures #qualifies (0.78) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2482
• Absence of archival plans should not be read as proof of intent #qualifies (0.75)