French repression’s martyrs and the F.L.N.’s mere survival drove its 1955 recruitment

Evidence

Various reasons have already been suggested for the F.L.N.’s recruitment successes in 1955. There was, first of all, the anger provoked by the excessive zeal of French repressive measures, in disregard of Machiavelli’s axiom, “An enemy should be destroyed or bought—and never made a martyr.” Then, perhaps more important still, there was the success of success itself: the mere fact that the F.L.N. had survived through that first winter against all the might of France was in itself a most potent recruiting agent. In the eyes of a people regarding baraka as a heaven-sent attribute, this was also greatly increased by the sheer audacity with which the moudjahiddine carried out their forays, made their proclamations and struck down those earmarked for liquidation. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 402

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘success of success’ and baraka mechanism connects to the reader’s interest in how counter-insurgency violence backfires on the colonial power. — connects to: French retaliation massacres played directly into the F.L.N.’s strategy — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 521; Forced assassination riveted F.L.N. recruits to the cause irreversibly; The F.L.N. justified civilian massacre as reprisal for collective repression — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 373 (+5 more)

Related

• French failed counterinsurgency reprisals drove the uncommitted into the F.L.N. (similarity 0.87)
• FLN gained most from French brutal strike-breaking methods. (similarity 0.86)
• French punitive failures drove uncommitted Auresians to join the F.L.N. (similarity 0.85)
• French mass arrests replenished the F.L.N. ranks they meant to deplete (similarity 0.85)
• The F.L.N. mirrored French collective responsibility with collective reprisals (similarity 0.83)
• Forced assassination riveted F.L.N. recruits to the cause irreversibly (similarity 0.82)
• Brutal French reprisals backfired by deepening Algerian hatred of France (similarity 0.82)
• Regroupment camps won militarily but drove Algerians into F.L.N. ranks (similarity 0.82)
• French countermeasures such as ratissages and prison drove Algerians into the F.L.N. (similarity 0.82)
• Collective responsibility backfired by giving the F.L.N. a key propaganda weapon. (similarity 0.82)
• The F.L.N. moved its terrorism into metropolitan France in summer 1958 (similarity 0.82)
• French retaliation massacres played directly into the F.L.N.’s strategy (similarity 0.82)
• French army sweeping operations drove Algerians into the F.L.N. (similarity 0.82)
• F.L.N. attacks on French schools were targeted war against French culture, not random savagery (similarity 0.81)
• The F.L.N. adopted total war against French civilians in direct retaliation. (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• French failed counterinsurgency reprisals drove the uncommitted into the F.L.N. #corroborates (0.90)
• French retaliation massacres played directly into the F.L.N.’s strategy #corroborates (0.85) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 521
• French mass arrests replenished the F.L.N. ranks they meant to deplete #corroborates (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 331
• French repression pushed postwar Algerian nationalism toward armed extremism #corroborates (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 224
• The F.L.N. justified civilian massacre as reprisal for collective repression #expands (0.65) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 373
• Forced assassination riveted F.L.N. recruits to the cause irreversibly #expands (0.60)
• The F.L.N. mirrored French collective responsibility with collective reprisals #expands (0.60)
• French political vacuum encouraged the F.L.N.’s Souk-Ahras offensive #expands (0.60)