Collective responsibility backfired by giving the F.L.N. a key propaganda weapon.

Evidence

Somewhat defensively, Soustelle claims that “collective responsibility” was effective, at least when applied to repairs of roads and telegraph poles; it accorded with the Arab mentality of respecting strength, despising weakness. At the same time, however, as Germaine Tillion pointed out, it gravely offended the Chaouias’ deep-rooted sense of justice, and, in the eyes of Yves Courrière, based on his interviews of F.L.N. leaders, it provided the F.L.N. with one of its “principal psychological trump cards”. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 358

Categorization

• XREF: Ties repressive policy to insurgent recruitment and propaganda — a classic counterinsurgency failure feedback loop. — connects to: The F.L.N. mirrored French collective responsibility with collective reprisals; Collective responsibility backfired by handing the F.L.N. a psychological advantage; The F.L.N. justified civilian massacre as reprisal for collective repression — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 373 (+3 more)

Related

• Collective responsibility backfired by handing the F.L.N. a psychological advantage (similarity 0.94)
• The F.L.N. mirrored French collective responsibility with collective reprisals (similarity 0.91)
• The F.L.N. justified civilian massacre as reprisal for collective repression (similarity 0.87)
• France’s collective responsibility doctrine mirrored the principle behind Nazi massacres. (similarity 0.86)
• Collective responsibility led French units to execute innocent Arab farmhands (similarity 0.84)
• French repression’s martyrs and the F.L.N.’s mere survival drove its 1955 recruitment (similarity 0.82)
• The F.L.N. massacred 301 peasants at Mélouza and blamed the French paras (similarity 0.81)
• The F.L.N. adopted total war against French civilians in direct retaliation. (similarity 0.80)
• The F.L.N. moved its terrorism into metropolitan France in summer 1958 (similarity 0.79)
• The F.L.N. adopted total war on civilians as its strategy (similarity 0.79)
• F.L.N. attacks on French schools were targeted war against French culture, not random savagery (similarity 0.79)
• The Palestro massacre paradoxically aided the F.L.N. by weakening French resolve for war. (similarity 0.79)
• The massacre was a strategic net gain for the F.L.N. despite its horror (similarity 0.79)
• The F.L.N. physically extended its Algerian terror and fundraising methods to metropolitan France. (similarity 0.79)
• French soldiers retaliated against Arab civilians with mass killing after rebel attacks (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• French retaliation massacres played directly into the F.L.N.’s strategy #corroborates (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 521
• The F.L.N. justified civilian massacre as reprisal for collective repression #expands (0.65) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 373
• Collective responsibility shifted from punishing villages to destroying them #expands (0.60)