The Philippeville massacre proved a strategic net gain for the F.L.N.

Evidence

Horrible as it was, there is no doubt that—on the principle set out by Carlos Marighela—for the F.L.N. this new Sétif was to prove a net gain. Though some Muslims may have recoiled in disgust, by October recruitment in the North Constantine area had risen to an estimated 1,400 “regulars”—almost the highest of any of the Wilayas—and from then on it was to remain throughout the war one of the most highly contaminated areas on the army “smallpox chart”. As Soustelle himself admitted, in the war of subversion the Philippeville massacre was a victory; for, between the two communities, “there had been well and truly dug an abyss through which flowed a river of blood”. What had hitherto been, in many respects, a “phoney war”—or drôle de révolution as some French called it—now became a full-blooded war to the end. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 388 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The Philippeville massacre was a net gain for the F.L.N. despite its horror; The massacre was a strategic net gain for the F.L.N. despite its horror — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 388; Philippeville’s slaughter convinced the F.L.N. that terror paid strategically (+3 more)

Related

• The Philippeville massacre was a net gain for the F.L.N. despite its horror (similarity 0.98)
• The massacre was a strategic net gain for the F.L.N. despite its horror (similarity 0.97)
• Philippeville’s slaughter convinced the F.L.N. that terror paid strategically (similarity 0.96)
• French retaliation massacres played directly into the F.L.N.’s strategy (similarity 0.85)
• Moderate Muslim and European integrationists were driven from the field after Philippeville (similarity 0.82)
• The Palestro massacre paradoxically aided the F.L.N. by weakening French resolve for war. (similarity 0.82)
• FLN gained most from French brutal strike-breaking methods. (similarity 0.82)
• F.L.N. attacks on French schools were targeted war against French culture, not random savagery (similarity 0.81)
• Philippeville’s backlash drove moderate Muslim deputies to repudiate integration (similarity 0.81)
• French repression’s martyrs and the F.L.N.’s mere survival drove its 1955 recruitment (similarity 0.80)
• Lamp-post bombs killed almost equal numbers of Muslims and Europeans, hurting F.L.N. image. (similarity 0.79)
• Mélouza massacre grew from F.L.N.-M.N.A. rivalry, not solely French action (similarity 0.79)
• The F.L.N. adopted total war against French civilians in direct retaliation. (similarity 0.79)
• Rebel guerrilla tactics eroded the French army’s moral terror over its enemies (similarity 0.79)
• The F.L.N. moved its terrorism into metropolitan France in summer 1958 (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• The Philippeville massacre was a net gain for the F.L.N. despite its horror #corroborates (1.00)
• The massacre was a strategic net gain for the F.L.N. despite its horror #corroborates (1.00) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 388
• Philippeville’s slaughter convinced the F.L.N. that terror paid strategically #expands (0.75)
• French retaliation massacres played directly into the F.L.N.’s strategy #expands (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 521
• Moderate Muslim and European integrationists were driven from the field after Philippeville #expands (0.65)
• French counterinsurgency repeatedly traded military advantage for political costs #expands (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 693