The massacre was a strategic net gain for the F.L.N. despite its horror

Evidence

Horrible as it was, there is no doubt that—on the principle set out by Carlos Marighela—for the F.L.N. this new Sétif was to prove a net gain. Though some Muslims may have recoiled in disgust, by October recruitment in the North Constantine area had risen to an estimated 1,400 “regulars”—almost the highest of any of the Wilayas—and from then on it was to remain throughout the war one of the most highly contaminated areas on the army “smallpox chart”. As Soustelle himself admitted, in the war of subversion the Philippeville massacre was a victory; for, between the two communities, “there had been well and truly dug an abyss through which flowed a river of blood”. What had hitherto been, in many respects, a “phoney war”—or drôle de révolution as some French called it—now became a full-blooded war to the end. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 388

Categorization

• XREF: Marighela’s provocation principle — terror designed to provoke over-reaction — pays off here and generalizes to insurgency theory elsewhere. — connects to: The Philippeville massacre proved a strategic net gain for the F.L.N.; Philippeville’s slaughter convinced the F.L.N. that terror paid strategically; The Philippeville massacre was a net gain for the F.L.N. despite its horror (+7 more)

Related

• The Philippeville massacre proved a strategic net gain for the F.L.N. (similarity 0.97)
• The Philippeville massacre was a net gain for the F.L.N. despite its horror (similarity 0.95)
• Philippeville’s slaughter convinced the F.L.N. that terror paid strategically (similarity 0.93)
• French retaliation massacres played directly into the F.L.N.’s strategy (similarity 0.84)
• The Palestro massacre paradoxically aided the F.L.N. by weakening French resolve for war. (similarity 0.84)
• F.L.N. attacks on French schools were targeted war against French culture, not random savagery (similarity 0.81)
• The F.L.N. adopted total war on civilians as its strategy (similarity 0.81)
• Mélouza massacre grew from F.L.N.-M.N.A. rivalry, not solely French action (similarity 0.81)
• The F.L.N. moved its terrorism into metropolitan France in summer 1958 (similarity 0.80)
• French repression’s martyrs and the F.L.N.’s mere survival drove its 1955 recruitment (similarity 0.80)
• F.L.N. terror backfired against France, not the F.L.N., abroad (similarity 0.80)
• FLN gained most from French brutal strike-breaking methods. (similarity 0.79)
• Lamp-post bombs killed almost equal numbers of Muslims and Europeans, hurting F.L.N. image. (similarity 0.79)
• The F.L.N. adopted total war against French civilians in direct retaliation. (similarity 0.79)
• F.L.N. annihilated the rival M.N.A. militia with French troops watching passively (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• F.L.N. terror backfired against France, not the F.L.N., abroad #corroborates (0.70)
• Collective responsibility backfired by giving the F.L.N. a key propaganda weapon. #expands (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 358
• The F.L.N. won its main war goal despite impending military defeat #qualifies (0.50)