French counterinsurgency strategy split between withdrawal and scorched-earth ratissage

Evidence

Again and again such punitive expeditions despatched into the Aurès came back empty-handed, and in the face of frustration General Spillmann’s instinct was to withdraw his undermanned forces and concentrate them on certain armed camps, like Arris, thus leaving the hills, temporarily anyway, to the rebels. Cherrière on the other hand was all in favour of the “fine-tooth comb”, the ruthless ratissage with resort to exemplary bombardments of suspect areas. But this was expressly forbidden by the Minister of the Interior. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 324

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Louverture chose scorched-earth war against the French invasion; Guerrilla warfare made French suppression of the insurgency fail; The French army won militarily while losing the political and world battle — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1653 (+4 more)

Related

• Louverture chose scorched-earth war against the French invasion (similarity 0.90)
• The army’s ambiguous pacification strategy left it unsuited to counterinsurgency (similarity 0.85)
• The French army’s heavy-handed countermeasures alienated even sympathetic observers (similarity 0.83)
• Guerrilla warfare made French suppression of the insurgency fail (similarity 0.81)
• French troops faced guerrilla warfare that negated their conventional military advantage. (similarity 0.81)
• The French army’s NATO-style force was ill-suited to counterinsurgency warfare. (similarity 0.81)
• French counterinsurgency repeatedly traded military advantage for political costs (similarity 0.80)
• A militarily victorious counterinsurgency can still lose due to non-battlefield factors (similarity 0.80)
• Seventy-five uncoordinated sectors made French offensives ineffective (similarity 0.79)
• Boumedienne abandoned frontal assault for pinprick harassment to freeze French troops (similarity 0.79)
• Rebel guerrilla tactics eroded the French army’s moral terror over its enemies (similarity 0.79)
• French failed counterinsurgency reprisals drove the uncommitted into the F.L.N. (similarity 0.78)
• Challe’s countersurgency sought permanent occupation of rebel strongholds rather than one-off victories (similarity 0.78)
• French countermeasures such as ratissages and prison drove Algerians into the F.L.N. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• The French army’s heavy-handed countermeasures alienated even sympathetic observers #complicates (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 346