Individual freedom is grounded in meanings others have already established.

Evidence

Freedom, understood as an ethical and political category, concerns the Other. Th ough it is through the dynamics of freedom that I as an individual reveal the meaning of the world, the meaning I reveal is grounded on the meanings others have bequeathed to me. Moreover, it is only by engaging the Other that I can express the desires and powers of freedom in ethically and politically legitimate ways. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 75

Categorization

• XREF: This anticipates the intersubjectivity debate in the Beauvoir-Sartre narrative: it departs from Sartre’s early solipsistic Being and Nothingness account of the other as threat. — connects to: Original sin is the fact of existing among others. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1009; A place’s meaning is fixed only by the future ends toward which freedom projects.; Freedom’s own possibilities rest on the ground of further possibilities (+8 more)
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: does this ‘freedom concerns the Other’ framing predate or diverge from Sartre’s own ethics, supporting the Beauvoir-first thesis?

Broader Connections

• Freedom is not self-founded but thrown, creating its own facticity #expands (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1156
• For social individuals, freedom is a positive relation to the environment #expands (0.72) — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 3668
• Freedom and situation are mutually constituting rather than opposites #expands (0.72) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1164