Even united elite support does not guarantee policy adoption beyond 56 percent.
Evidence
When both interest groups and affluent Americans oppose a policy it has an even lower likelihood of being adopted (these proposed policies consist primarily of tax increases). At the other extreme, high levels of support among both interest groups and affluent Americans increases the probability of adopting a policy change, but a strong status quo bias remains evident. Policies with strong support (as defined above) among both groups are only adopted about 56 percent of the time (strongly favored policies in our data set that failed include proposed cuts in taxes, increases in tax exemptions, increased educational spending for K–12, college support, and proposals during the Clinton administration to add a prescription drug benefit to Medicare). — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 99
Categorization
- ADDENDUM: The status-quo bias that defeats even united elite coalitions parallels the corruption/bypass reading of ‘control deficit’ — institutional friction is itself part of the power structure.
Related
- Affluent Americans shape policy adoption far more than interest-group support does. (similarity 0.87)
- U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree (similarity 0.83)
- Correlated elite and mass preferences do not reflect citizen influence on policy. (similarity 0.80)
- General public opinion barely moves policy outcomes when elite preferences are held constant. (similarity 0.79)
- Majorities of citizens lose when elites and organized interests disagree. (similarity 0.79)
- Large public majorities favoring policy change lose most of the time. (similarity 0.79)
- Average citizens have little independent influence on U.S. policy relative to economic elites. (similarity 0.78)