Conflict and partnership-distrust situations share one identical game structure

Evidence

It is interesting that this problem, though it arises most dramatically in situations that would usually be characterized as conflict, like that between the Russians and us or between the burglar and me, is logically equivalent to the problem of two or more partners who lack confidence in each other. If each is under some temptation to abscond with the joint assets; if each has a little suspicion that the other may be contemplating the same thing; if each realizes that the other may suspect too, and may suspect himself the object of suspicion; we have a pay-off matrix identical with that of a surprise attack problem. If the heat is on some members of the mob, the rest of the mob may be tempted to rub them out to keep them from squealing, and those in danger may be tempted to squeal in self-defense. So the game structure of “preclusive self-defense” is the same as that of “partnership confidence.” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 463

Categorization

• XREF: Connects squarely to the reader’s Gambetta mapping: mafia partners/hostages and the defection problem are the same structure as superpower surprise attack. — connects to: Chronic mutual distrust in protection markets requires unambiguous commitment markers; Trust and distrust are asymmetric when interests visibly conflict; Trust matters precisely because relations have prisoner’s-dilemma structure — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 908 (+3 more)
• ADDENDUM: The mob ‘rub them out to keep them from squealing’ line is the private-enforcement theme the reader is building — preemptive elimination as substitute for legal process.

Related

• Chronic mutual distrust in protection markets requires unambiguous commitment markers (similarity 0.88)
• Even conflict between adversaries can be modeled as partnership discipline (similarity 0.81)
• Conflict settings share common-interest structures across wildly different scales (similarity 0.80)
• Both secrets and certain capabilities are best renounced under mutual suspicion. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Trust matters precisely because relations have prisoner’s-dilemma structure #corroborates (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 908
• Trust and distrust are asymmetric when interests visibly conflict #expands (0.82)
• Distrust functions as an equivalent alternative to trust #corroborates (0.80) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 262
• Even conflict between adversaries can be modeled as partnership discipline #exemplifies (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 738