Emotions function as motivational drives that organize behavior toward valued outcomes.

Evidence

Like other theories of emotion (Arnold, 1969; Duffy, 1941; Frijda, 1986; Lazurus, 1991), this theory of emotional intensity begins with the assumption that emotions are states of motivational arousal—they ‘urge behavior designed to promote or prevent important outcomes or urge adaptation to important outcomes that have already occurred’ (Brehm, 1999, p. 4). Emotions can be ‘defi ned by an intentional structure: that of maintaining or changing a given situation’ (Frijda, 1986, p. 98). That is, they are motivational states that organize and control behavior (e.g. Brehm & Brummett, 1998). — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 22

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies the core premise of Brehm’s emotional intensity theory as applied here: emotions are motivational arousal states defined by an intentional structure of maintaining or changing situations.
• XREF: connects to: Emotional intensity is capped by the subjective importance of the emotion’s function. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 589; Perceived competence is necessary to translate motivation into rescue action — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social…, 180; Emotions adaptively mobilize attention, behavior hierarchies, and physiology to respond to environmental demands. — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 24 (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• Emotions mediate the link between group appraisals and action tendencies #corroborates (0.85) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2265
• Emotions like anger drive and independently cost norm enforcement #exemplifies (0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 135
• Anxiety drives careful attention while enthusiasm drives emotional involvement. #exemplifies (0.82) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 1741
• Emotions are performative and goal-oriented while feelings need no intentional object #corroborates (0.80) — Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics, 97
• Recognizing gaps between one’s actual behavior and egalitarian ideals motivates change through compunction #exemplifies (0.78) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 121
• Feelings are constative while emotions are performative and intentional #expands (0.78) — Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics, 97