Feelings are constative while emotions are performative and intentional

Evidence

Feelings are constative. For instance, we say: ‘I have a feeling that.’ In contrast, it is impossible to say, ‘I have an affect (or an emotion) that.’ Emotions are not constative, but performative. They refer to actions and deeds. Furthermore, they are intentional and goal-oriented. Feelings, on the other hand, do not necessarily display an intentional structure. Often, the feeling of anxiety has no concrete object. That is what makes anxiety different from fear, which has an intentional structure. Nor is a ‘feel’ – that is, a sense – for language intentional. Its non-intentionality is what distinguishes it from linguistic expression, which, because it ex-presses, is e-motive. A feeling of cosmic oneness – an oceanic sense of the world (ein kosmisches Mitgefühl, ein ozeanisches Welt-Gefühl) – that does not focus on anything or anyone in particular is also possible. — Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics, 97

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Gives a crisp operative test: one has ‘a feeling that X’ but never ‘an emotion that X’; anxiety (feeling) lacks fear’s intentional object.
  • XREF: connects to: Emotions are short-lived and exploitable; feelings endure and resist exploitation — Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New…, 98; Emotions are performative and goal-oriented while feelings need no intentional object — Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New…, 97; Emotional capitalism exploits emotions’ fleeting performativity, which feelings lack — Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New…, 98 (+1 more)

Broader Connections