Detailed statutes force legislatures into future amendment burdens that interpretation could carry
Evidence
It is illuminating to examine both the general code of a state and the mass of amendatory legislation which emerges from a typical session with this thought in mind. How much of the detail of the code was necessary and wise? How much of the amendatory legislation would have been needed if the legislature had had more humility about its capacity to predict the future, and more confidence in the agencies of interpretation? — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3894
Categorization
- XREF: Builds directly on ch5’s claim that legislatures may wait for courts, and the recurring division-of-responsibility theme between courts and legislature throughout this volume. — connects to: Appropriations acts carry legislative directions beyond mere fund listings — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 2577; Legislatures cannot foresee every result of unguarded statutory language — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1335; Tightly detailed legislation strips interpreters of law-development and forces relentless amendments — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3893 (+9 more)
- ADDENDUM: Ties to the polyad law/institutions thread on the boundaries of effective statutory drafting vs interpretive delegation.
Broader Connections
- Courts should attribute purpose to statutes and interpret words to serve it
#corroborates(0.85) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3499 - Reading meaning into statutes corrupts once legislation becomes an available remedy
#expands(0.80) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1975 - Interpretive debates require attention to institutional capacities and dynamic effects.
#expands(0.80) — Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 19 - Courts can include new subjects under old statutes despite absent legislative intent
#exemplifies(0.80) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1406 - Courts decide statutory meaning where legislative intent is genuinely ambiguous
#corroborates(0.75) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 490 - Statutes emerge as skeletons that agencies flesh out through regulation.
#expands(0.75) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1393