Reading meaning into statutes corrupts once legislation becomes an available remedy

Evidence

Dean Pound makes clear that he does not appro-ve -off spurious interretatidh T~e-object of it, he say “is to maka, unmake, or remke n ot merely to discover. It puts a meaning into the text as a juggler puts coins, or what not, into a dunmy’s hair, to be pulled forth presently with an air of discovery. It is-essentially a legislative, not a judicial process, made necessary in formative periods by the paucity of principles, f6ebIReDness of legislation, and rigidity of rules characteristic of archaic law. So long as law is regarded as sacred, or for any reason as incapable of alteration, such a process is necessary to growth, but surviving into periods of legislation, it becomes a source of confusion.” — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1975

Categorization

• DEFINE: Pound’s vivid definition of ‘spurious interpretation’ as putting meaning in as a juggler stuffs coins.
• XREF: connects to: Equitable construction can restrain, enlarge, or contradict a statute’s letter — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1903; Amendment-by-implication doctrine can ratify an agency’s contested interpretation when Congress touches a statute — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 509; Detailed statutes force legislatures into future amendment burdens that interpretation could carry — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3894 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Courts should attribute purpose to statutes and interpret words to serve it #contradicts (0.85) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3499
• Plain-meaning interpretation itself presupposes a policy rule favoring literal reading #corroborates (0.72) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1989
• Legislative history supplies evidence of an enactment’s purpose and intended meaning #complicates (0.70) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2460
• Literal application of legal rules sometimes produces absurd against-purpose outcomes #qualifies (0.70) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 284