Courts can include new subjects under old statutes despite absent legislative intent

Evidence

Of course the possibility of women jurors was not beyond the bounds of legislative imagination (one hopes). In this respect, the situation differs somewhat from a statute covering “vehicles” enacted in 1880 before the automobile was invented. If at a later date the question arises whether the statute covers automobiles, it is obvious that the legislature could have had no intent one way or the other. … Does it follow that, in the absence of any specific intent, automobiles may not be included? The courts have not thought so. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1406

Categorization

• XREF: The vehicle/automobile example is the canonical illustration of dynamic statutory interpretation, linking to the general-purpose reading in ch10 and ch16. — connects to: Three presumptions govern how courts attribute purpose to statutes. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 884; Courts may not amend a statute however desirable policy change may be — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1059; Statutes serve courts as analogies and points of departure, not controlling rules — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1398 (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• Technological change forces courts to extend old statutes to unanticipated situations. #exemplifies (0.85) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1421
• Statutes serve courts as analogies and points of departure, not controlling rules #corroborates (0.80) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1398
• Courts decide statutory meaning where legislative intent is genuinely ambiguous #expands (0.80) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 490
• Prior interpretations can foreclose renewed inquiry into a statute’s basic purpose #contradicts (0.80) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3193
• Courts should attribute purpose to statutes and interpret words to serve it #expands (0.75) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3499
• A settled statutory interpretation binds later courts like law, not dictum. #qualifies (0.75) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3173