Legislatures cannot foresee every result of unguarded statutory language
Evidence
It is a dangerous assumption to suppose that the Legislature foresees every possible result that may ensue from the unguarded use of a single word, or that the language used in statutes is so precisely accurate that you can pick out from various Acts this and that expression and, skillfully piecing them together, lay a safe foundation for some remote inference. β Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1335
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the broader Legal Process materials on statutory purpose and the limits of plain meaning β echoes the ch10 material that statutes need general language because draftsmen cannot anticipate all applications. β connects to: Statutes need general language because draftsmen cannot anticipate all applications. β Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems inβ¦, 831; Literal statutory interpretations are defeasible starting points β Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 303; Tightly detailed legislation strips interpreters of law-development and forces relentless amendments β Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems inβ¦, 3893 (+3 more)
- SHARE: A crisp doctrinal aphorism on statutory interpretation a legal-institutions colleague would enjoy, drawn verbatim from case law.
- recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
Broader Connections
- Detailed statutes force legislatures into future amendment burdens that interpretation could carry
#qualifies(0.80) β Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3894 - Literal statutory interpretations are defeasible starting points
#responds-to(0.75) β Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 303 - Tightly detailed legislation strips interpreters of law-development and forces relentless amendments
#responds-to(0.75) β Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3893