Deliberative consensus theories wrongly deny pluralism’s constitutive conflict

Evidence

By postulating the availability of a non-exclusive public sphere of deliberation where a rational consensus could obtain. they negate the inherently conflictual nature of modern pluralism. They are unable to recognize that bringing a deliberation to a close always results from a tkcision which excludes other possibilities and for which one should never refuse to bear responsibility by invoking the commands of general rules or principles. … By warning us against the illusion that a fully achieved democracy could ever be instantiated, it forces us to keep the democratic contestation alive. To make room for dissent and to foster the institutions in which it can be manifested is viral for a pluralist democracy, and one should abandon the very idea that there could ever be a time in which it would cease to be necessary because the society is now ‘well-ordered’. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 469

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Establishes the core agonistic thesis: consensus always rests on exclusion, contestation must never be presumed finished.
  • QUESTION: If deliberation closure is always a decision excluding possibilities, what does agonistic closure legitimation look like without slipping into pure will?
  • XREF: connects to: Agonistic pluralism rejects the ideal of a fully inclusive rational consensus — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 327; Wittgensteinian analysis exposes how democratic consensus emerges — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 321; The family-resemblance insight undercuts deliberative democracy’s aim of rational consensus. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 336 (+10 more)

Broader Connections