De Gaulle’s intransigence aligned with French public opinion rather than his entourage’s despair

Evidence

Tuesday, 26 January, began on a note of at least negative good news for the government; the army had not crossed the Rubicon, no putsch had started in either Algiers or Paris; there had been no reaction by the Muslims in Algeria, or by the F.L.N. which remained curiously and attentively passive. But Debré reported back from Algiers, thoroughly shaken by what he had seen and heard, and warning that the least false step would lead to formation of a military junta in Algiers. During an emotion-charged tête-à-tête between two old soldiers, de Gaulle, who had just buried his brother, told Marshal Juin: “I am an old man. I too am going to die soon.” Then, before the Marshal could wipe the tears from his eyes, in an abrupt change of tone, de Gaulle declared: “Whatever happens, I cannot give in. I will not give in to a riot…. If I did, I should be nothing more than a marionette and within a fortnight I would have a new uprising, a new ultimatum on my shoulders.” … Yet, in fact, events were to prove that it was de Gaulle who was instinctively, and accurately, in touch with the mood of France. With the passing of each successive day of the crisis, it became evident that public opinion—from Left to Right—was setting solidly behind de Gaulle, solidly against the Algiers insurgents and their dissident allies in the army. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1109

Categorization

• XREF: Shows the dynamics of a leader reading public mood against his own advisers — parallels the Algerian uprising cycles Horne traces throughout. — connects to: De Gaulle’s intransigent refusal to yield to the riots proved strategically correct; De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain a fundamentally contested riddle.; French metropolitan opinion rallied behind de Gaulle against the Algiers insurgents (+4 more)

Related

• De Gaulle’s intransigent refusal to yield to the riots proved strategically correct (similarity 0.92)
• French metropolitan opinion rallied behind de Gaulle against the Algiers insurgents (similarity 0.92)
• De Gaulle hid his Algerian self-determination policy because public opinion was unready (similarity 0.86)
• Gaulle hid his Algeria intentions to avoid capsizing French public opinion. (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain a fundamentally contested riddle. (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle’s personal authority rallied France against the Algerian insurrection without any new concession. (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle’s triumphant Algeria slogans masked his private conviction the colony was doomed (similarity 0.81)
• Algiers ultras harbored deep Pétainist loyalties and distrust of de Gaulle (similarity 0.81)
• Junior officers saw Algerian independence immediately in de Gaulle’s self-determination speech (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle’s June 1958 Algiers rhetoric was deliberately ambiguous, hiding his pessimism (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle’s mystical self-assurance blinded him to the F.L.N.’s political character. (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle’s first public offer of power was deliberately equivocal and terrifying (similarity 0.80)
• December’s lesson reshaped de Gaulle’s subsequent Algeria policy (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle concealed his Algerian aims to avoid capsizing public passions #contradicts (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1155
• De Gaulle hid his Algerian self-determination policy because public opinion was unready #contradicts (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1154