Gaulle hid his Algeria intentions to avoid capsizing French public opinion.

Evidence

Were I to announce my intentions point-blank, there was no doubt that the sea of ignorant fear, of shocked surprise, of concerted malevolence through which I was navigating would cause such a tidal wave of alarms and passions in every walk of life that the ship would capsize. I must, therefore, manoeuvre without ever changing course until such time as, unmistakably, common sense broke through the mists…. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1155 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

One is left with the question, why did de Gaulle practise such ambiguity, even to baffling Tricot and fudging up the record afterwards (a practice not unknown in the memoirs of ex-heads of state)? If he had believed in “self-determination” in 1958, why had he not then said so outright, instead of letting his supporters deceive themselves and the war drag on for over another year before coming out with it? Tricot, bravely loyal, suggests that part of the reason may have lain in the hazards of communication between de Gaulle and his subordinates. … French public opinion was certainly not ready in 1958 to admit the possibility of Algerian autonomy. So many thousands of young Frenchmen had done their national service in Algeria and their emotions were still deeply committed there. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1154 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

That he was already speaking in two voices, however—one for the elated masses, another for his own private, clairvoyant pessimism—seems to be indicated by a coldly cynical remark de Gaulle uttered to quell the jubilation of an over-eager aide immediately on his return from this peak of triumph: “L’Afrique est foutue, et l’Algérie avec!” Of his Mostaganem exclamation of “Vive l’Algérie française!” which its exponents would regard as the holy writ, he later explained dismissively that it had just “escaped” from him; it was superficial, just like talking about “French Canada”. On the other hand, those even more controversial words, Je vous ai compris, de Gaulle states were “seemingly spontaneous but in reality carefully calculated”; their purpose was “to establish emotional contact”. But just what did this mean? De Gaulle explained later that his whole message of June was “tantamount to saying that the day would come when the majority amongst them could decide the destiny of all”. Certainly, however, no one who heard the words agreed on understanding exactly what de Gaulle had understood. The army for one had become “dupes”, said Charles-Henri Favrod, to his “incantatory” language. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 926 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: De Gaulle’s triumphant Algeria slogans masked his private conviction the colony was doomed; De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain a fundamentally contested riddle.; De Gaulle hid his Algerian self-determination policy because public opinion was unready — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1154 (+2 more)

Related

• De Gaulle hid his Algerian self-determination policy because public opinion was unready (similarity 0.94)
• De Gaulle’s triumphant Algeria slogans masked his private conviction the colony was doomed (similarity 0.94)
• De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain a fundamentally contested riddle. (similarity 0.93)
• De Gaulle’s June 1958 Algiers rhetoric was deliberately ambiguous, hiding his pessimism (similarity 0.92)
• De Gaulle’s ambiguity made every faction believe he would serve their agenda (similarity 0.89)
• De Gaulle concealed his Algerian aims to avoid capsizing public passions (similarity 0.88)
• De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain irreducibly ambiguous even to his closest associates. (similarity 0.88)
• De Gaulle’s ambiguity to the army was deliberate deception for its own good. (similarity 0.88)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.87)
• Gaulle concealed the pullout from the army to preserve it. (similarity 0.86)
• De Gaulle’s first public offer of power was deliberately equivocal and terrifying (similarity 0.86)
• De Gaulle’s pursuit of national grandeur required sacrificing Algeria. (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s intransigence aligned with French public opinion rather than his entourage’s despair (similarity 0.85)
• Junior officers saw Algerian independence immediately in de Gaulle’s self-determination speech (similarity 0.84)
• Algeria was only one element of de Gaulle’s larger ambitions. (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle concealed his Algerian aims to avoid capsizing public passions #corroborates (0.95) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1155
• De Gaulle hid his Algerian self-determination policy because public opinion was unready #corroborates (0.90) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1154
• De Gaulle’s June 1958 Algiers rhetoric was deliberately ambiguous, hiding his pessimism #corroborates (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 926