De Gaulle hid his Algerian self-determination policy because public opinion was unready

Evidence

One is left with the question, why did de Gaulle practise such ambiguity, even to baffling Tricot and fudging up the record afterwards (a practice not unknown in the memoirs of ex-heads of state)? If he had believed in “self-determination” in 1958, why had he not then said so outright, instead of letting his supporters deceive themselves and the war drag on for over another year before coming out with it? Tricot, bravely loyal, suggests that part of the reason may have lain in the hazards of communication between de Gaulle and his subordinates. … French public opinion was certainly not ready in 1958 to admit the possibility of Algerian autonomy. So many thousands of young Frenchmen had done their national service in Algeria and their emotions were still deeply committed there. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1154

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to later chapters on de Gaulle’s double-talk and its fatal consequences for the army and the O.A.S. — connects to: De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution.; De Gaulle’s triumphant Algeria slogans masked his private conviction the colony was doomed; De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain a fundamentally contested riddle. (+9 more)

Related

• Gaulle hid his Algeria intentions to avoid capsizing French public opinion. (similarity 0.94)
• De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain a fundamentally contested riddle. (similarity 0.90)
• De Gaulle’s triumphant Algeria slogans masked his private conviction the colony was doomed (similarity 0.88)
• De Gaulle’s June 1958 Algiers rhetoric was deliberately ambiguous, hiding his pessimism (similarity 0.88)
• De Gaulle’s intransigence aligned with French public opinion rather than his entourage’s despair (similarity 0.86)
• De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain irreducibly ambiguous even to his closest associates. (similarity 0.86)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.85)
• Junior officers saw Algerian independence immediately in de Gaulle’s self-determination speech (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s ambiguity made every faction believe he would serve their agenda (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s allies saw Algeria as subordinate to the French state’s crisis (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle’s pursuit of national grandeur required sacrificing Algeria. (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle’s first public offer of power was deliberately equivocal and terrifying (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle and Challe gave conflicting accounts of the self-determination private briefing. (similarity 0.84)
• Algeria was only one element of de Gaulle’s larger ambitions. (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle’s ambiguity to the army was deliberate deception for its own good. (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle concealed his Algerian aims to avoid capsizing public passions #corroborates (0.90) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1155
• De Gaulle’s delay on Algeria stemmed from overhauling France’s whole system #qualifies (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 954