De Gaulle’s ambiguity to the army was deliberate deception for its own good.

Evidence

That he was already speaking in two voices, however—one for the elated masses, another for his own private, clairvoyant pessimism—seems to be indicated by a coldly cynical remark de Gaulle uttered to quell the jubilation of an over-eager aide immediately on his return from this peak of triumph: “L’Afrique est foutue, et l’Algérie avec!” Of his Mostaganem exclamation of “Vive l’Algérie française!” which its exponents would regard as the holy writ, he later explained dismissively that it had just “escaped” from him; it was superficial, just like talking about “French Canada”. On the other hand, those even more controversial words, Je vous ai compris, de Gaulle states were “seemingly spontaneous but in reality carefully calculated”; their purpose was “to establish emotional contact”. But just what did this mean? De Gaulle explained later that his whole message of June was “tantamount to saying that the day would come when the majority amongst them could decide the destiny of all”. Certainly, however, no one who heard the words agreed on understanding exactly what de Gaulle had understood. The army for one had become “dupes”, said Charles-Henri Favrod, to his “incantatory” language. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 926 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

When all is said and done, de Gaulle’s achievement was immense, and the gratitude owed him by France as well as the Western world no less. As ex-Premier Debré remarked to the author, “It was a miracle that we didn’t collapse into civil war after Algeria; and this we owed to de Gaulle.” The prosperous stability of post-1962 France stems to an important extent from the consequences of de Gaulle’s coolness and sense of timing in May 1958, and his steadfast refusal then to come back as the army’s man. If he had been strictly “straight” with the Massus, Challes and Salans all along, could the disastrous putsch of 1961 have been avoided? On the other hand, recalling the dangerously delicate balances of May 1958, might not such blinding honesty simply have brought about de Gaulle’s over-throw and replacement by a military junta in 1959 or 1960, or even late 1958 — leading possibly to civil war in France itself? — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1658 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

The choice of the place, the famous terrace of the 18th Brumaire, so steeped in associations of Napoleonic coups d’états, seemed a curious one. De Gaulle was embarrassed, not having thought of the historical association, while Pflimlin was frankly disturbed by it. His misgivings were not allayed by de Gaulle’s continued refusal to repudiate the use of force by the Algiers leaders, and notably the takeover of Corsica. As he had insisted at every private and public meeting since 13 May, he repeated that, at his age, he had no desire to become either a Napoleon I or Napoleon III. “You know very well”, he assured Pflimlin, “that I will never return to power brought in by force. I will not be the man of an insurrection. Never will I accept a military dictatorship, never, never.” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 898 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution.; De Gaulle’s triumphant Algeria slogans masked his private conviction the colony was doomed; De Gaulle’s ambiguity made every faction believe he would serve their agenda (+4 more)

Related

• De Gaulle’s ambiguity made every faction believe he would serve their agenda (similarity 0.97)
• De Gaulle’s calculated ambiguity prevented civil war and French collapse. (similarity 0.91)
• De Gaulle’s June 1958 Algiers rhetoric was deliberately ambiguous, hiding his pessimism (similarity 0.91)
• De Gaulle’s triumphant Algeria slogans masked his private conviction the colony was doomed (similarity 0.90)
• Gaulle hid his Algeria intentions to avoid capsizing French public opinion. (similarity 0.88)
• De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain a fundamentally contested riddle. (similarity 0.88)
• De Gaulle refused to repudiate the army’s force while denying dictatorial intent (similarity 0.87)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.86)
• De Gaulle’s true intentions on Algeria remain irreducibly ambiguous even to his closest associates. (similarity 0.86)
• De Gaulle refused to return to power by force, rejecting Napolonic dictatorial paths. (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle’s mystical self-assurance blinded him to the F.L.N.’s political character. (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle hid his Algerian self-determination policy because public opinion was unready (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle’s first public offer of power was deliberately equivocal and terrifying (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.82)
• Gaulle concealed the pullout from the army to preserve it. (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle’s June 1958 Algiers rhetoric was deliberately ambiguous, hiding his pessimism #corroborates (0.85) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 926
• De Gaulle’s calculated ambiguity prevented civil war and French collapse. #qualifies (0.55) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1658
• De Gaulle refused to return to power by force, rejecting Napolonic dictatorial paths. #complicates (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 898