Majority rule has no automatic superiority over supermajority rules in constitutional theory

Evidence

More specifically, the question of supermajorities as a way to restrain the ”tyranny of the majority” features prominently in the Constitutional theory by Hayek (1960) and in Buchanan and Tullock (1962). The latter, for instance, argue that the simple majority rule does not have any particular ”superior” standing and under certain conditions may lead to excessive costs imposed on individual liberties by collective action. — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 16

Categorization

• SEED: Angle: why the 51% threshold is a historical accident, and what a supermajoritarian polity would actually feel like to live in.
• XREF: Direct bridge to public-choice economics (Buchanan and Tullock, Calculus of Consent). — connects to: Statutory change often needs functional supermajorities despite majority-vote rhetoric — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 64