Unpublished arbitration still signals norms via industry gossip networks.

Evidence

Some members of the DDC board of arbitrators are concerned that the lack of published opinions explaining the basis of decisions gives dealers the wrong signals about what type of behavior is sanctioned. Although cases are officially kept secret, the industry is “like a bunch of old ladies,” and in new and unusual cases the result can rapidly become known. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 248

Categorization

• XREF: Relates to the reader’s knowledge of Coleman-Burt on network closure and gossip: secrecy fails to insulate behavior precisely because dense networks transmit sanctions informally. — connects to: Community reputational enforcement works even without repeated bilateral interaction between traders. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 65; Arbitration secrecy hides disputes from public view once judgments are paid — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 71; Private arbitration outcomes affect market behavior even without published precedent — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 248 (+5 more)
• SHARE: The ‘like a bunch of old ladies’ line about secret industry arbitration is a delightfully specific anecdote for anyone interested in informal legal ordering or the diamond business.

Related

• Arbitration secrecy hides disputes from public view once judgments are paid (similarity 0.83)
• Private arbitration outcomes affect market behavior even without published precedent (similarity 0.81)
• Arbitration’s secrecy lets wrongdoers minimize reputation costs while right-holders gain speed and cheapness. (similarity 0.80)
• Secrecy of arbitral disputes preserves a party’s creditworthiness and reputation. (similarity 0.80)
• Trade arbitrators are creating precedent through published principles while preserving secrecy. (similarity 0.80)
• Secrecy norms make an industry prefer extralegal agreements over courts (similarity 0.79)
• Secrecy norms drive the bourse to prefer extralegal agreements over enforceable contracts. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Private arbitration outcomes affect market behavior even without published precedent #corroborates (0.88) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 248
• Intermediaries reduce reputational information costs in extralegal markets. #expands (0.80) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 133
• Community reputational enforcement works even without repeated bilateral interaction between traders. #expands (0.78) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 65
• Arbitration secrecy hides disputes from public view once judgments are paid #contradicts (0.75) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 71
• Arbitration’s secrecy lets wrongdoers minimize reputation costs while right-holders gain speed and cheapness. #qualifies (0.75) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 81
• Private arbitration systems resolve disputes without public accountability. #qualifies (0.74)
• Economic institutions depend on personal networks that generate trust and enforce norms #expands (0.72) — Coleman, SocialCapitalCreation-1988, 28
• Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. #expands (0.72) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193