Being unreachable during negotiation strengthens one’s bargaining position

Evidence

An asymmetry in communication may well favor the one who is (and is known to be) unavailable for the receipt of messages, for he is the one who cannot be deterred from his own commitment by receipt of the other’s. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 71

Categorization

• XREF: Echoes the reader’s hostage/commitment framework: the Mafia’s enforcement value partly derives from being unavailable to renegotiate — threats are delivered and no longer retractable. — connects to: Binding oneself can paradoxically strengthen one’s bargaining position — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 60; In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 130; Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289 (+1 more)

Related

• In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength. (similarity 0.84)
• The power to send but not receive gives a bargainer an unanswerable advantage (similarity 0.82)
• Binding oneself can paradoxically strengthen one’s bargaining position (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength. #corroborates (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 130
• Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289