Being rational, informed, and in control is not always strategic
Evidence
It is not true, as illustrated in the example of extortion, that in the face of a threat it is invariably an advantage to be rational, particularly if the fact of being rational or irrational cannot be concealed. It is not invariably an advantage, in the face of a threat, to have a communication system in good order, to have complete information, or to be in full command of oneβs own actions or of oneβs own assets. Mossadeq and my small children have already been referred to; but the same tactic is illustrated by the burning of bridges behind oneself to persuade an adversary that one cannot be induced to retreat. An old English law that made it a serious crime to pay tribute to coastal pirates does not necessarily appear either cruel or anomalous in the light of a theory of strategy. β Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 52
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Knowledge of social life does not produce greater control over fate β Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 111; Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy β Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 257; Universal distrust is too costly to be a rational strategy (+8 more)
Broader Connections
- The Myth of Optimal Awareness - Why Sanity Requires Strategic Auto-Pilot
#expands(0.90) - Knowledge of social life does not produce greater control over fate
#expands(0.85) β Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 111 - Humans face ignorance of facts and indeterminacy of aim when regulating conduct
#expands(0.85) β HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Lawβ¦, 368 - Universal distrust is too costly to be a rational strategy
#exemplifies(0.80) - Rational agreement operates through shared psychic expectations, not mathematical reasoning
#expands(0.80) β Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 275 - Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy
#expands(0.75) β Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 257